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TAXING THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS: WHY SECTION 
501(C)(6) TRADE ASSOCIATIONS ARE UNDESERVING OF 
TAX EXEMPTION 
PHILIP T. HACKNEY† 
 
ABSTRACT 
The United States has long nourished a vibrant and extensive non-
profit sector. It accomplishes this in part by providing a subsidy through 
exemptions from tax at the federal, state, and local levels. The subsidy is 
provided to charitable organizations, social welfare organizations, labor 
unions, business leagues, and many other nonprofit organizations. I argue 
that we should end the subsidy for the nonprofit groups that represent 
business interests. Some argue that we should subsidize nonprofit groups 
that provide goods or services that would not otherwise be sufficiently 
supplied by the market (market failure theory). Additionally some argue 
that we subsidize to promote pluralism and a robust civic sector. Neither 
theory supports the provision of this subsidy to business interests. There 
is little evidence of market failure in this sector. Interest group literature 
has long shown business interests dominate the interest group sector. We 
can thus expect the subsidy to enhance that bias rather than reduce it. 
Furthermore, because of significant collective action problems suffered 
by large latent groups, the policy of subsidizing business interests likely 
enhances the voice of the politically strong business interests, and deval-
ues the voice of the politically weak. We should end or at the least weak-
en policies subsidizing business interests.  
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Miller, Shu Yi Oei, James Puckett, Sussanah Tahk, and Donald Tobin. I thank the members of the 
2013 and 2014 Junior Tax Conference and the 2014 Tulane Tax Law Roundtable. Finally, a big 
thanks to the LSU Law Center for a grant making this work possible. I especially thank my research 
assistants Amelia Hurt, Joseph Ellison, Randall Thomas, and Jeff Butler for their dedicated work on 
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INTRODUCTION 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment 
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.  
—Adam Smith1 
The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings 
with a strong upper-class accent. 
—E.E. Schattschneider2 
  
1. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 232 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Classics 
1999) (1776). 
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Many were recently surprised and outraged when they found out 
that the National Football League (NFL) is exempt from federal income 
tax.3 While the NFL has indicated it now plans to switch to taxable sta-
tus,4 it has long avoided paying income tax because it is considered a tax-
exempt business league just like a chamber of commerce or the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA).5 Barbers, or lawyers, or doctors, or football 
team owners, to name some, can join forces as tax-exempt business 
leagues, pool their money, invest their money, provide business services, 
share information, and generally promote and lobby legislators regarding 
their common business interest, all without owing any income tax.6 
Many U.S. representatives and senators have recently called for the re-
moval of this tax exemption for all sports leagues including the NFL.7 
This Article agrees that ending the tax exemption of these sports-related 
business leagues is a good idea; however, denying exemption to sports 
business leagues does not go far enough. Business leagues as a category 
fail to satisfy any theory justifying income tax exemption. Furthermore, 
providing exemption to these organizations likely even causes some 
harm. This Article calls for Congress to end tax exemption for these or-
ganizations. 
In the nonprofit world, business leagues are considered mutual-
benefit organizations because they work primarily to benefit the mem-
bers of the organization, such as the aforementioned barbers, lawyers and 
doctors. Tax exemption for mutual-benefit organizations such as busi-
  
 2. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960). 
 3. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012). Congress added “professional football leagues” to the 
statute in 1966. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–800, § 6(a), 80 Stat. 1508, 1515 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2012)). 
 4. See Richard Rubin, NFL Will End Its Tax-Exempt Status, Goodell Tells Owners, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 28, 2015 10:50 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-04-
28/nfl-will-end-its-tax-exempt-status-goodell-tells-team-owners. 
 5. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) exempts from income tax “[b]usiness leagues, chambers of com-
merce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or professional football leagues (whether or not adminis-
tering a pension fund for football players), not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” § 501(c)(6). 
 6. Id. § 501(a). 
 7. Senator Coburn has introduced the PRO Sports Act, S. 1524, that excludes all professional 
sports leagues from qualifying as tax-exempt organizations. PRO Sports Act, S. Res. 1524, 113th 
Cong. (2013). Representative Dave Camp’s Tax Reform Act of 2014 called for the removal of 
exemption for sports leagues in § 5301 of that proposal. DAVE CAMP, TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014 
DISCUSSION DRAFT § 5301, at 162 (2014), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ways_and_means_section_by_section_summary_final
_022614.pdf. Senators Maria Cantwell and Harry Reid introduced a bill that would pull the exemp-
tion of the NFL to put pressure on the NFL for maintaining the mascot name of the Washington 
Redskins. S. 2884, 113th Cong. (2014); Press Release, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell, Cantwell, Reid, 
Johnson Introduce Bill that Would Revoke NFL’s Tax-Exempt Status (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://www.cantwell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=0b70fa20-f382-484f-a343-
333e39b0ae57. Senator Cory Booker has also introduced legislation calling for the end of the NFL’s 
exemption. Securing Assistance for Victims’ Empowerment (SAVE) Act, S. 2816, 113th Cong. 
(2014). His proposal would send the tax paid to support domestic violence victims. Bernie Becker, 
Senators Throw Hail Mary at NFL, THE HILL (Sept. 21, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/218398-senators-throw-hail-mary-at-nfl. 
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ness leagues is generally accepted to be the provision of a subsidy.8 The 
subsidy for business leagues occurs because three forms of income are 
not taxed: (1) investment income; (2) commercial income from the sale 
of goods and services to members and nonmembers; and (3) member 
income from member dues. Because much of the activities conducted by 
business leagues would be deductible at some point, the subsidy is most-
ly a matter of tax deferral rather than full exemption.9 The subsidy likely 
amounts to a relatively small amount compared to the tax system on the 
whole. Nevertheless, it does establish an opportunity for a significant 
sector of the business community to save in a tax-free manner to enhance 
the opportunities of a business league’s members. Furthermore, federal 
tax-exempt status is so often used as a signal for worthiness of other im-
portant subsidies and benefits such as state and local property tax exemp-
tion that getting tax exemption right at the federal level has many im-
portant spillover effects.10 
Some argue we should subsidize nonprofits that provide goods or 
services that would not otherwise be sufficiently supplied (market failure 
theory).11 Additionally some argue that we should subsidize nonprofits to 
promote pluralism and a robust civic sector (pluralism theory).12 This 
Article argues that neither theory applies to support exemption for busi-
ness leagues. It demonstrates that the goods and services supplied by 
business leagues are generally not undersupplied. This undermines sup-
port for the market failure theory. Additionally, business interests suffer 
relatively little collective action problems as compared to large, latent 
interests, such as the poor. This undermines the support for the pluralism 
theory. Interests that can never organize will never be able to access the 
subsidy of tax exemption. Business interests, on the other hand, as will 
  
 8. See Philip T. Hackney, What We Talk About When We Talk About Tax Exemption, 33 VA. 
TAX REV. 115, 151–52 (2013). 
 9. See Daniel Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 155–56 
(2006). 
 10. BAZIL FACCHINA, EVAN SHOWELL & JAN E. STONE, TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY: 
PRIVILEGES & EXEMPTIONS ENJOYED BY NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: A CATALOG AND SOME 
THOUGHTS ON NONPROFIT POLICYMAKING 44–46 (1993) (cataloging some of the different rights 
nonprofit organizations are entitled to beyond federal income tax exemption such as exemption from 
state sales and property taxes). The state of Louisiana for instance provides exemption from ad 
valorem taxation to business leagues under article 7, section 21 of its state Constitution. LA. CONST. 
art. VII, § 21(B)(3). It provides the exemption to “a nonprofit corporation devoted to promoting 
trade, travel, and commerce, and also property of a trade, business, industry or professional society 
or association, if that property is owned by a nonprofit corporation or association organized under 
the laws of this state for such purposes.” Id. 
 11. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate 
Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 67–68 (1981); see Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the 
Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS 21, 22–24 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986). 
 12. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (describing the “role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often 
sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints”); see also LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA’S 
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 14 (2d ed. 1999); John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in 
AMERICA’S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT, at ix, xiii–xv (Brian O’Connell ed., 1983). 
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be demonstrated in the Article, seem to have relatively easy access to this 
subsidy. Thus, instead of promoting pluralism by promoting all diverse 
interests that wish to organize and lobby government, the subsidy for 
business interests enhances the voice of the politically strong and deval-
ues the voice of the politically weak. Thus, the subsidy worsens pluralist 
interests rather than enhancing them.  
Although not particularly numerous (approximately 67,000 regis-
tered as tax-exempt in 2013),13 nor awash in national assets or revenue 
($71 billion in total assets and $41 billion in total revenue in the sector in 
2013),14 these organizations are often considered some of the most politi-
cally influential organizations in the country.15 Post Citizens United,16 
many who closely observe our political system have called for new regu-
lation of business leagues and social welfare organizations through the 
Code focusing primarily on disclosure rules related to political campaign 
activity.17 This Article adds to the tax legal literature on tax-exempt or-
ganizations by viewing them through the lens of interest-group literature. 
  
 13. Internal Revenue Service, Data Book, 2013, IRS PUBLICATION 55B, 56 tbl.25 (2013), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13databk.pdf. 
 14. Number of Non-501(c)(3) Exempt Organizations in the United States, 2013, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS, 
http://nccsweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt=CO (last visited June 23, 
2015) (information derived from the IRS Business Master File 10/2013). 
 15. Business leagues, such as the National Federation of Independent Business, the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, and the American Association for Justice, regularly made up the majority of 
the organizations listed in Fortune magazine’s Power 25, a list of the most influential lobbying 
organizations on the federal level based on a polling of insiders. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., 
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE 224 (2009). Fortune maintained the list from 1997 to 2001. Alt-
hough the list is not based on any scientific principles in assessing actual influence, it does correlate 
with amount of resources placed towards influencing national policy. Id. at 223–24. In the first 
quarter of 2013, Roll Call published a list of the twenty-five largest lobbying spending firms—eight 
of the twenty-five were comprised of business leagues, with the top three being business leagues. 
Kent Cooper, Top 25 Organizations Lobbying in First Quarter, ROLL CALL (Apr. 23, 2013, 7:40 
AM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/moneyline/top-25-organizations-lobbying-in-first-quarter/. Of the list 
of the biggest lobbying spenders of 2013, OpenSecrets.org indicates that five business leagues were 
included in the top ten. Organization Profiles, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/ 
(last visited June 23, 2015) (crediting the Center for Responsive Politics). The other five are business 
corporations. Id.  
 16. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 17. The DISCLOSE Act of 2012 sponsored by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse would have 
amended the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to provide for additional disclosure from 
corporations, labor unions, and other organizations when they make “independent expenditure[s]” 
effectively advocating for a candidate. Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in 
Elections Act of 2012, S. 3369, 112th (2d Sess. 2012); see also Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclo-
sure and Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELECTION L.J. 427, 
440 (2011) (calling for disclosure of contributions to certain tax-exempt organizations for political 
action on a rapid basis); Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, the Dark Election of 
2010 and Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Finance Disclo-
sure Laws, 16 NEXUS 59, 92–93 (2010–2011) (calling for requiring tax-exempt organizations to 
disclose substantial donors when such organizations advertise for political causes); Greg Colvin, A 
Silver Bullet that Would End Secret Tax-Exempt Money in Elections, CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICA’S 
FUTURE (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://blog.ourfuture.org/20120411/A_Silver_Bullet_That_Would_End_Secret_Tax-
Exempt_Money_in_Elections (proposing a cap on political intervention spending by any organiza-
tion organized under § 501(c) of the lesser of $100,000 or 10% of expenditures). 
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The primary contribution of this Article is to highlight the dominant pur-
pose of these organizations, describe their activities, and demonstrate 
why they do not fit well into the tax exemption rubric. 
There are many interest groups in addition to business leagues in-
cluding for-profit corporations and other tax-exempt organizations, such 
as labor unions18 and social welfare organizations.19 This Article focuses 
on business leagues in an attempt to get a greater understanding of the 
interest group role played by one small facet of the exempt organization 
sector. There is a dearth of scholarly legal literature on social welfare 
organizations, labor unions, and business leagues as part of the nonprofit 
sector or part of the tax-exempt sector. Given the challenges the IRS has 
lately faced in regulating this sector,20 it seems an opportune time to 
begin a careful examination of the roles of these important organizations 
to our society. 
Legal scholars who examine the role of interest groups often exam-
ine ways to justify the regulation of lobbying21 or the limits on campaign 
finance spending.22 They view these intrusions of money into the politi-
cal process as harmful to the country because of either corruption or 
harm to national economic interests because such activities engage in 
harmful rent-seeking.23 They see the logic of imposing such regulation to 
be common sense. They view the First Amendment as the primary reason 
we might be circumspect in imposing regulation on the political activities 
of these groups.24 However, instead of focusing on the regulation of lob-
bying or political campaign activity, this Article focuses on whether we 
should subsidize organizations whose primary purpose is to lobby and 
engage in some political campaign activity.  
Many scholars of the tax-exempt sector espouse the political science 
theory of pluralism as a reason to strongly support exemption for a broad 
range of nonprofit organizations.25 However, political scientists and 
  
 18. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5) (2012). 
 19. Id. § 501(c)(4). 
 20. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INAPPROPRIATE CRITERIA WERE 
USED TO IDENTIFY TAX-EXEMPT APPLICATIONS FOR REVIEW, NO. 2013-10-053, at 3–5 (2013), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201310053fr.pdf (describing 
how tax-exempt status is reviewed and determining that the IRS inappropriately reviewed some tax-
exempt applications). 
 21. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. 191, 191–92 (2012) (examining current lobbying regulations and proposing and justifying a 
new national economic welfare rational for lobbying regulation). 
 22. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban, 
VAL. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475908 (exploring the constitutional status of 
the corporate campaign contribution ban and effects of recent Supreme Court cases). 
 23. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 22; Hasen, supra note 21, at 226–35. 
 24. Hasen, supra note 21, at 234–40. 
 25. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (describing the “role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often 
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economists long ago found that pluralism as a description of the political 
universe misses significant factors in interest group formation. Mancur 
Olson demonstrated that there are some groups and interests, such as the 
poor, that are so large and latent that it is very difficult if not impossible 
for them to organize even with a subsidy.26 A close study of business 
leagues shows that they form with relative ease and appear to dominate 
the interest group sector. Large, latent interests like the poor are rarely 
able to organize. The subsidy is easily accessed by most business inter-
ests but rarely accessed by less powerful organized interests. Thus, in-
stead of tax exemption operating as a neutral, democracy-enhancing law, 
it likely does just the opposite by protecting and enhancing the status quo 
of powerful interests.  
A possible implication of this finding is that tax exemption may 
generally harm democracy rather than improve it. If true, we should re-
think the exemption of exempt organizations that represent the political 
voice of various interests, such as social-welfare organizations, labor 
unions, and business leagues. I do not take a position on this issue in this 
Article. I plan to look in greater depth at the activities of these organiza-
tions in future articles. It might be that there are some interests that are 
substantially underrepresented in our democracy, such that exemption 
may be the right policy option. In this Article I simply maintain that the 
exemption for business leagues is not needed as a market response. Addi-
tionally, the subsidy causes harm to our democracy by enhancing the 
voice of an already powerful group. 
Arguably, if we eliminated tax exemption for business leagues 
many of them might be able to reorganize as social welfare organizations 
and maintain exempt status. This seems highly likely, and for that reason 
if there were an elimination of exemption for business leagues there 
would need to be a similar closing of access to tax exemption under other 
sections of the Code such as § 501(c)(4). Peak organizations such as the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce may still qualify. As will be discussed in the 
Article in Part III.A, in many cases peak organizations actually do suffer 
collective-action problems. So perhaps a move from one tax-exempt sec-
tion to another makes sense. I argue, however, that the business-league 
sector as a whole should be eliminated because, as will be seen below, 
business interests are already well represented in our democracy and 
providing these organizations extra money for greater voice is a bad idea. 
Finally, business leagues are powerful. Removing exemption may 
be politically impossible. As a second-best move, I recommend applying 
a net-investment income tax on business leagues as is already applied on 
  
sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints”); see also SALAMON, supra note 12, at 14; Gardner, 
supra note 12, at xiii–xv.  
 26. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 57–59 (2d prtg. 1971). 
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tax-exempt social clubs.27 The Clinton administration unsuccessfully 
attempted to do just this in 1999.28 While this would not entirely limit the 
subsidy to business leagues, it would modestly improve the status quo.29 
As an important side benefit, eliminating exemption for business leagues 
would reduce the need for the IRS to make a determination as to whether 
a business league had engaged in too much political campaign interven-
tion, a notoriously challenging problem for the IRS.30  
Part I of this Article considers the scholarly literature regarding col-
lective action as it relates to the formation of interest groups. Part II de-
scribes the requirements of qualifying as a tax-exempt business league 
and the rationales justifying these organizations’ exemption. It then eval-
uates the implications of collective action theory for the exemption ra-
tionales. It additionally reviews taxing regimes that might apply to busi-
ness leagues instead of a policy of tax exemption to provide a suitable 
comparison. Part III provides a more detailed look at the activities of 
business leagues by providing case studies regarding the three general 
types of business leagues: peak organizations, trade associations, and 
professional associations. Someone unfamiliar with business leagues 
might choose to start first with Part III. The concrete examples of the 
formation, maintenance, and activities of these organizations can help in 
understanding the first two Parts of this Article. Part IV concludes that 
ending exemption for business leagues is the right policy choice. 
I. INTEREST GROUP MOBILIZATION AND THE COLLECTIVE-ACTION 
PROBLEM 
Ever since James Madison’s Federalist No. 10, we have been con-
cerned in the United States about the ability of groups to unfairly influ-
ence our democracy. Madison referred to this problem as rule by faction. 
By faction he meant a situation where either a minority or a majority of 
citizens “are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or 
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
aggregate interests of the community.”31 However, Madison recognized 
  
 27. 26 U.S.C. § 512(a)(3) (2012). I made this argument regarding applying the net investment 
income tax to the whole of the mutual-benefit organizations of the tax-exempt sector. See Hackney, 
supra note 8, at 120–24. 
 28. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 278–82 (Comm. Print 
1999), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2888; see also Jacob 
M. Schlesinger, Clinton Plan to Tax Lobbyists’ Investment Gains Hits Home in a Fury of Faxes, 
Letters, Web Sites, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1999, at A24 (describing the lobbyist efforts opposing the 
proposed tax increase). 
 29. See Halperin, supra note 9, at 135–37 (discussing the deferral effect granted if only a net 
investment tax is applied to such organizations). 
 30. Cf. Donald B. Tobin, Political Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next “Loop-
hole”?, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 41, 54–56 (2007) (considering whether the 26 U.S.C. § 527 rules 
are mandatory for organizations that carry on as a political party but choose to operate as a taxable 
entity). 
 31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 48 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2005). 
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the absolute need for citizens to express their voice. Thus, instead of rec-
ommending the elimination of factions, Madison recommended a repub-
lican form of government along with the separation of powers.32 These 
institutions he believed would limit the ability of any one particular 
group to establish tyranny.33 To Madison, tyranny meant total control 
over the government and the people by one group.34 Today, scholars con-
tinue to examine the problem of faction through the study of interest 
groups. 
All business leagues are interest groups. An interest group is “a col-
lection of individuals or a group of individuals linked together by profes-
sional circumstance, or by common political, economic, or social inter-
ests” that satisfies three requirements: (1) the organization is not a politi-
cal party, i.e., the name of the organization does not appear on a ballot; 
(2) it uses some of its resources to try to influence legislative, judicial, or 
executive decisions at any level of government; and (3) it is organized 
outside of the government it intends to influence.35 Business leagues are 
not political parties, they use significant resources to influence govern-
mental decisions at all levels, and they are organized outside of govern-
ment. Finally, although business leagues perform functions in addition to 
acting as a governmental mouthpiece, “[i]nterest groups’ service organi-
zations quite ironically are by-products of their lobbying organizations, 
not the other way around.”36  
Thus, studies regarding the interest group sector are relevant to a 
study of business leagues. However, interest group literature is vast and 
conflicting. For instance, research considering the effectiveness of inter-
est groups in lobbying and electoral efforts is still relatively undevel-
oped.37 A researcher studying interest groups faces substantial problems 
of proof given the vast complexity of the sector and its interaction with 
the government.38 The researcher must often be able to measure actions 
that are dynamic rather than static.39 Nevertheless, there is an area of 
interest group research that has achieved great success: questions of col-
  
 32. See id. at 51–53. 
 33. See id. at 51. 
 34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 261 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 
2005) (“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands . . . 
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
 35. JOHN R. WRIGHT, INTEREST GROUPS AND CONGRESS: LOBBYING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND 
INFLUENCE 22–23 (1996) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 36. John Mark Hansen, The Political Economy of Group Membership, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
79, 94 (1985). 
 37. For a review of the state of the literature from a number of years ago, see FRANK R. 
BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS 
AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 13–17, 128–29 (1998). 
 38. See id. at 18. 
 39. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 15, at 169–70. The authors conducted a longitudi-
nal study providing new knowledge on the effectiveness of lobbying over a period of time and across 
a wide range of organizations and interests. Id. at 1–2. 
274 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:2  
lective action.40 This happens to be fortunate for this inquiry because the 
question of collective action is the question of how well certain interest 
group services fare in the marketplace. When are people and organiza-
tions able to organize in order to provide the interest group services they 
desire?  
Part I demonstrates that of all the interest group sectors, business in-
terests face the least collective-action problem. In other words, business 
interests as compared to labor, environmentalists, the poor, etc., face the 
smallest amount of market failure in organizing to represent their inter-
ests before government. Instead of the business league subsidy working 
to ensure our society has the right level of needed goods and services, it 
may lead to an oversupply of business-league services. In turn, this could 
lead to a democracy that is over reflective of business interests. 
A. Pluralism Problems 
When the study of interest groups and their impact on politics began 
in earnest in the early to mid part of the twentieth century, there was a 
belief that individuals who had an interest could and would express that 
interest through a group if they had the desire.41 In the 1940s and1950s 
pluralism reigned as the prevailing theory of group politics.42 Pluralism 
holds that groups express the interests of the people to their govern-
ment.43 Furthermore, interest groups provide the ideal vehicle to ensure 
that our democracy most closely represents the interests of its people.44 
To some theorists, “[t]here is no group without its interest. An interest . . 
. is the equivalent of a group.”45 In this purist conception of pluralism, no 
obstacles stand in the way of individuals who want to form an interest 
group.46 Based on these principles, the pluralist asserted that in order to 
know what a government is going to do, all you need do is study interest 
group interaction and negotiation with each other and the government.47 
There are two main strains of pluralism. In one version, the gov-
ernment acts as referee ensuring that a reasonable bargain is negotiated 
among the interest groups of society.48 This is pluralism in a descriptive 
  
 40. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 8. 
 41. See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at ix–x (1986). 
 42. SCOTT H. AINSWORTH, ANALYZING INTEREST GROUPS 5 (2002). 
 43. Id.; BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 48. 
 44. Id.  
 45. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES 
211 (The Principia Press of Ill., Inc. 1949) (1908); see also Charles B. Hagan, The Group in a Politi-
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and the American Pressure System, 46 J. POL. 1006, 1007 & n.1 (1984) (discussing the pluralist 
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 48. DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC 
OPINION 104–06 (1951). 
2015] TAXING THE UNHEAVENLY CHORUS 275 
sense. Another version of pluralism, however, argues for the values of 
pluralism in a prescriptive sense.49 The prescriptive pluralist believed we 
should encourage the formation of groups to enhance our representation-
al democracies’ closer reflection of the interest of its people.50 Some tax-
exempt scholars argue in favor of tax exemption from this prescriptive 
approach. For example, some argue that providing exemption to nonprof-
it organizations is a part of the solution to ensuring a more representative 
democracy.51 By providing a subsidy for the formation of groups, we 
encourage everyone to form groups to represent their interests to the 
government and the government will thereby be more reflective of all the 
people’s interests. 
In what is known as the disturbance theory of interest group for-
mation, David Truman, a pluralist, said that interest groups form in 
waves.52 For Truman, a political interest group is made up of individuals 
with shared interests and claims upon others that the group attempts to 
satisfy through the governmental process.53 When individuals determine 
they have a need that can only be delivered by government, i.e., a need 
where “rights are not well established and negotiation costs are high,”54 
those individuals will organize a group to ask the government to fulfill 
that need. This simple act of organization disturbs the status quo.55 That 
disturbance sends waves through the political system because another set 
of individuals will organize in reaction to offset the demands of the first 
group.56 In Truman’s theory, groups form in greatest numbers during 
times of change, such as technological, social, economic, or political.57  
E. E. Schattschneider criticized the pluralist claim famously stating 
that “[t]he flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings 
with a strong upper-class accent.”58 Although there are plenty of interest 
groups that form, he said, the groups that form overwhelmingly represent 
the interests of the wealthy rather than the average citizen.59 For 
Schattschneider, there are those groups that work for public interest and 
  
 49. AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 6; JEFFREY M. BERRY & CLYDE WILCOX, THE INTEREST 
GROUP SOCIETY 11 (5th ed. 2009). 
 50. AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 6; BERRY & WILCOX, supra note 49, at 11. 
 51. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (describing the “role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often sharply 
conflicting, activities and viewpoints”); see also SALAMON, supra note 12, at 15–17 (explaining that 
nonprofit organizations are essential to the sense of community which is required to uphold a demo-
cratic polity); Gardner, supra note 12, at xiii–xv (stating that nonprofit organizations foster creativity 
and nurture our “national life”). 
 52. TRUMAN, supra note 48, at 59. 
 53. Id. at 33.  
 54. AINSWORTH, supra note 41, at 13. 
 55. TRUMAN, supra note 48, at 59–62. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 57; see also AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 13. 
 58. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 2, at 35. 
 59. Id. at 31–34. 
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those that work for private, or special, interests.60 The distinction be-
tween the two groups is the exclusive character of one over the other.61 
Thus, a group that works for world peace or child welfare is not exclu-
sive, but the National Association of Manufacturers is exclusive—only 
manufacturers can belong.62 These exclusive organizations are “special 
interests.”63 Additionally, there are those that are organized and those 
that are not organized. Only the organized can impact the rights of the 
community and the political process.64 To Schattschneider, to understand 
politics you should study small groups.65 As Schattschneider said, “It has 
been assumed that only legal barriers inhibited the disfranchised. We 
know better now. The exclusion of people by extralegal processes, by 
social processes, by the way the political system is organized and struc-
tured may be far more effective than the law.”66  
In 1965, Mancur Olson offered a theoretical basis for why the inter-
est-group system is biased in favor of the “upperclass” and business in-
terests as Schattschneider contended.67 This theory also supported the 
claim that not all groups with an interest can or will organize. He demon-
strated through his economic model that small homogenous groups can 
form with relative ease while large latent groups form with great chal-
lenge, if at all.68 The difference between a small homogenous group and 
a large latent group is at once self-explanatory, but also a matter of basic 
economic principles. Groups form to provide collective goods that  can-
not be provided through individual action.69 However, interest groups 
face significant free-rider problems because of the collective nature of 
the goods interest groups necessarily primarily provide.70 With the free-
rider problem, public goods that cost less than the return one person will 
receive in return will be provided; public goods that cost more than the 
return to one person will be provided at inefficient levels, or will not be 
provided at all. And, this is the economic defining characteristic of a 
large latent group: “in a large group in which no single individual’s con-
tribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a whole . . . it is 
certain that a collective good will not be provided unless there is coer-
cion or some outside inducements.”71 
Olson evaluated whether his theory explained specific group con-
texts that he could observe. He noted that within the trade association 
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context, the collective-action problem will typically hinder the formation 
of all except small groups of narrow interests.72 Larger groups will be 
forced to either use outside inducements by selling what Olson referred 
to as “selective incentives,” such as insurance or information, or obtain 
coercion from a source like the state.73 Olson defined selective incentives 
as private goods, such as insurance, or administrative operations, or dis-
counts on other goods, and services that are sold by a group to induce 
members to join.74 Groups provide selective incentives because the pub-
lic good is by its own terms available whether the individual joins or not.  
With respect to trade associations, Olson provided anecdotal evi-
dence as to the size of the trade association pressure community.75 A 
lobbying index from the late 1940s provided evidence that trade associa-
tions made up about two-thirds of the interest group community.76 That 
type of representation dwarfed any other type of interest at that time.77 
Olson asserts that business dominance of the interest group sector “must 
be due in large part to the fact that the business community is divided 
into a series of (generally oligopolistic) ‘industries,’ each of which con-
tains only a fairly small number of firms.”78 Olson suggests that in most 
instances the trade associations involved in the pressure community have 
a relatively small number of members.79 At the time of his writing, the 
median number of members of a trade association was somewhere be-
tween 24 and 50.80 Today, membership of trade associations still tends to 
be small—the median number of memberships of American business 
associations in 2002–2003 was 353.81  
In spite of the numerical superiority, there are latent interests in the 
business community that face collective action problems.82 For instance, 
the business community as an interest in its own right is represented by 
peak organizations like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. This broad 
business interest is not made up of small homogenous interests and thus 
faces problems with organizing consistent with other large latent inter-
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ests. Professional associations, too, represent a large group of people 
whose interests are not entirely homogenous;  such groups  face collec-
tive-action problems too. While professionals often manage to form into 
groups, the individuals with such professional interests need to find 
means other than the collective good, consisting of promoting and lobby-
ing for the particular professional interest, to entice people to join the 
group. Thus, organizations like the medical societies and the American 
Medical Association (AMA), discussed in more detail in Part III below, 
and the bar associations and the American Bar Association (ABA), pri-
marily overcome the collective-action problem by obtaining government-
related coercion.83 These associations establish licensing systems at the 
state level and require significant educational requirements to force 
membership via coercion.84 Thus, professional associations manage to 
operate “closed shop[s],” so desired by labor unions.85 
Professional associations do not rely on coercive efforts alone to 
solve the collective action problem; they also use selective incentives 
that often have a strong compulsory nature.86 For instance, legal malprac-
tice insurance is often hard to find outside of the bar association. They 
sell publications too that strongly connect  the professional community 
and provide opportunities to network.87 Of course, as we will see in Part 
III below in the case of the AMA, and in part in the case of the Cotton 
Trade Institute, these associations may also control a code that industry 
players must purchase from the association in order to operate in the in-
dustry. These codes can provide the business group substantial monetary 
support, particularly where it has the imprimatur of the state.88  
B. Research on the Collective-Action Problem 
Although many criticize Olson’s theory, the central instinct that 
small, economic special-interest groups possess a significant advantage 
over other groups in organizing has not been contradicted by later re-
search. The critiques of Olson’s theory focus on the fact that under his 
theory there should be few to no broad-based public interest groups.89 
Thus, consumer and environmental groups should not form with any 
great regularity.90 However, after Olson wrote, these two types of inter-
ests proliferated. Modelers of Olson’s theory predict that less than 5% of 
a latent population should mobilize, but in many instances some strongly 
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public-oriented interests have obtained population slices that are much 
greater than that.91 Some research thus takes a look at why and how these 
interests are able to overcome the collective-action problem.92 This re-
search considers how selective incentives work in solving the collective-
action problem and whether other incentives may play a role.93 
Nevertheless, the evidence discussed in the next three sections be-
low shows business interests maintain an overwhelming advantage in 
interest group formation.94 Not surprisingly, individuals and entities with 
the resources to organize—i.e., money, facilities, and skilled professional 
individuals—organize to represent their interests with greater ease than 
other individuals and entities. Finally, research demonstrates that interest 
groups (1) obtain a large share of their resources from a few large well-
financed members, and (2) the organizations tend to follow the lead of 
those members.95 
1. Bias in the Interest Group System Leans Heavily Towards Busi-
ness Interests 
Empirical evidence confirms that there is a bias in the interest group 
system towards business interests.96 In a simple review of interest groups 
that lobbied in Washington in 1981, Schlozman found that business 
leagues comprised 24.8% of the total interests.97 Corporations them-
selves comprised 45.7% of that interest group community engaged in 
federal lobbying.98 Foreign commerce and corporations made up another 
6.5% of those represented.99 All other identified groups amounted to only 
13% of the total Washington D.C. interest group community.100 This 
small portion was composed of labor unions, public interest groups, civil 
rights groups and minority organizations, social welfare and the poor, the 
elderly, gays, women, handicapped, and governmental units.101 Schloz-
man showed that compared to the interests of the U.S. population as a 
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whole, this interest group system is skewed away from the actual inter-
ests of all the people of the country.102  
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady updated this same work in a recent 
book The Unheavenly Chorus.103 In their review the authors emphasize a 
point that cannot be understated: business has a significant organizational 
advantage in that it already has the skills, power, and resources to organ-
ize.104 We should thus not find it surprising that business interests would 
be so adept at organizing. In a strict counting of groups within the entire 
interest group system in 2001, the authors find that business interests 
continue to dominate.105 Business leagues, including trade associations 
and professional associations, altogether make up a full 20% of repre-
sented interests.106 Individual corporations still are the predominant lob-
byist group at approximately 35%.107 The next closest in representation 
are state and local governments with 10.4%.108 Labor unions are only 1% 
of the interest group population, education 4.2%, health 3.5%, and social 
welfare and poor make up 0.8%.109 Public interest consists of 4.6% while 
identity groups 3.8%.110  
How do these numbers compare to the 1981 numbers?111 Intriguing-
ly, while the nominal business interests have grown they have not kept 
pace with the growth of some other sectors. The sectors that have grown 
significantly are health (883%), education (612%) and state and local 
governments (382%).112 Realistically though this growth is likely directly 
related to business interests associated with healthcare and education, as 
health and education have both boomed as industries in this period. 
While this reflects real growth, part of the sizable growth is because 
there were almost no groups lobbying in these fields in 1981. For in-
stance, there were eleven public educational institutions and nineteen 
private educational institutions lobbying in 1981.113 Thus, while business 
interests may have grown, their relative growth turns out to make them a 
smaller set of the interest community. Corporations decreased relatively 
almost a full 10%, while trade associations decreased by almost 5%.114 
This does not mean that business interests as a total amount are less than 
in 1981. Business interests did increase, but business interest growth did 
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not keep pace with some other significant interests. However, as noted, it 
could be that some of that significant growth in the health and education 
sector should be associated with the business interests that we are con-
sidering here.  
Schlozman et. al. primarily approach the question of interest group 
representation from the question of political voice inequality. They find 
that “[c]onsistent with Schattschneider’s analysis . . . the economically 
disadvantaged are underrepresented in pressure politics.”115 Notably in 
the case of unions, the authors observe that because labor unions are so 
small comparatively, they are forced to spread their limited capacity 
across a wide spectrum of issues.116 Not inconsistent with the point above 
that business interests have the skills, power and resources to organize, 
as demonstrated by the numbers reported above, professional associa-
tions alone outnumber unions by a far shot.117 
Lowery and Gray criticize these interest group studies that rely on a 
simple count of the number of interest groups that lobby because the 
studies, they say, fail to use a baseline upon which to judge bias in the 
interest system.118 They claim that the authors have no method of judging 
what an interest group ecosystem should be expected to look like.119 De-
spite the critique, Lowery and Gray in a recent book with co-author Benz 
consider the question of the count of organizations at the state level and 
find that the representation bias at the state level is even more severe.120 
For instance, business interests made up 73.8% of the lobbying commu-
nity in 1997 as compared to 62% at the federal level one year prior in 
1996.121 In other work, Gray and Lowery along with other authors pro-
vide strong support for the Olson claim that the smaller the set of persons 
to organize within an interest the greater likelihood that group will or-
ganize.122 They show there is a direct correlation between a larger num-
ber of business firms in a state and a lower number of such firms inde-
pendently lobbying.123 Despite the baseline critique, Lowery and Gray 
recognize that none of their objections disproves the high degree of like-
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lihood that business interests are relatively over represented in our politi-
cal system.124 
Gray and Lowery have also added to interest group organizational 
knowledge by providing evidence that only a finite number of groups can 
exist in an interest group system.125 Their model demonstrates that the 
number of interest groups in any interest group system is not infinite, as 
the pluralists seemed to suggest, and as tax-exemption literature often 
seems to accept.126 Under their approach, a certain population density 
supports a limited number of groups as a result of population resources 
and ability of the government to interact with a certain number of 
groups.127 Once that saturation level is reached, it is much harder for 
more interests to form. Tax exemption of business leagues may very well 
help to crowd out other interests that never organize because they are 
crowded out. This is consistent with the findings that the status quo is 
incredibly powerful in the interest group system.128 
2. Use of Selective and Purposive Incentives to Organize 
After Olson’s seminal collective action work, many interest group 
scholars focused on how latent organizations, such as environmental 
interests, form despite the significant collective action challenge such 
groups should face. The research has focused on the sale of selective 
incentives and purposive incentives. This area of research still needs 
significant work, but the quest to determine the level of difficulty some 
groups may experience in organizing has had some success. 
Olson did not initially consider the possibility of selling member-
ship to interest groups through purposive incentives; purposive incen-
tives refer to the sale of the promotion of ideas that people strongly sup-
port from a moral or emotional basis.129 Olson had argued that the prima-
ry way of solving the collective-action problem would be to sell selective 
incentives such as insurance and magazines.130 However, contrary to 
Olson’s suggestion, research demonstrates that many organizations are 
able to sell membership on a cause-related basis. For instance, people 
will pay for membership in the Sierra Club to be associated with the 
cause of environmentalism. Cause-related incentives are typically re-
ferred to in the literature as “purposive incentives.”131 Still, citizen 
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groups and other interests also sell selective incentives to overcome the 
collective-action problem identified by Olson.132  
Robert Salisbury introduced a model to explain group formation 
that he called the exchange theory of formation.133 His model provides 
support for a conclusion that business groups should be in a much better 
position to form than cause-related groups. Consistent with Olson’s as-
sumption that people join groups for selfish reasons, he viewed group 
formation as taking place within the context of a marketplace.134 Under 
the exchange theory, entrepreneurs form groups to sell material, solidary, 
or expressive benefits to members for a price.135 In other words, rather 
than these nonprofits being “voluntary” associations, they sell goods and 
services in the market just like for-profit firms. An entrepreneur will not 
form a group nor maintain it unless he is able to make the profit that he 
desires.  
Salisbury focuses two major factors of interest group formation: (1) 
groups tend to form when the economy is on the upswing, and (2) groups 
most commonly rely upon material benefits to form.136 Because material 
benefits are likely less elastic than purposive benefits we should expect 
that groups that rely on purposive benefits, such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union, will experience greater difficulty forming and maintain-
ing status than those that rely on material benefits.137 In other words, in 
the case of purposive-based groups, member contributions will be a func-
tion of member income; if member income goes down, membership for 
an organization that sells purposive incentives should fall at a greater rate 
than for an organization that offers material incentives.138  
James Q. Wilson studied the ways certain groups overcome the col-
lective-action problem by offering purposive incentives.139 Contrary to 
the claim that individuals are purely rational economic actors, Wilson 
found that some people have a stronger sense of duty than others and join 
groups to support a particular cause.140 Typically joining these groups is 
low cost and low involvement,141 and these cause-related groups have 
developed effective means of persuading individuals to join; they em-
phasize the threat of loss rather than gain because psychologically, the 
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threat of loss appears to remain a stronger force in our minds. 142 Finally, 
cause-related groups often rely on a wealthy sponsor; their contributions 
make the cost of membership much lower.143 This last detail is discussed 
in more detail in Section 3 below. 
Terry M. Moe demonstrates that there are individuals who system-
atically overestimate their importance to the accomplishment of a cause. 
These individuals join to support an effort that they cannot really aid to 
the extent they believe.144 In other words, members join out of self-
interest, but they make a mistake in believing that their contributions 
“make a difference.”145 Moe concludes from this that the collective-
action problem is solved more often than Olson’s theory would have 
predicted because individuals make mistakes about the return they will 
receive from the investment of time or money they make in a large or-
ganization.146 However, it does not mean that such groups form with 
greater ease than those with the proper resources and material incentives 
to sell. 
John Hansen’s work provides further support for the claim that 
while larger, latent interests can form by selling purposive incentives, 
once formed, these groups often need to sell selective incentives in order 
to maintain status. Furthermore, business groups are in a far better posi-
tion to generate incentives to sell. Hansen found that a group forms first 
in response to a threat as suggested by the pluralist disturbance theo-
ries.147 The newly formed group generates political benefits by respond-
ing to the threat in a political sense. However, in order to maintain or 
increase its membership, the group often must sell selective incentives 
such as insurance.148 This work supports the claim that small groups have 
little trouble forming without selective incentives. For instance, industry 
groups dominated in the early twentieth century because of their small 
size and easy access to resources to organize.149 
The importance of all this work is that cause-related groups can 
form, but they face much greater challenge than do business groups. 
Even though cause-related groups might be able to find selective incen-
tives to sell, the business community naturally tends to possess the right 
material incentives to sell, and the right human and capital resources to 
organize. 
  
 142. Id. at x. 
 143. Id. at xii. 
 144. TERRY M. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTERNAL 
DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS 205–07 (1980). 
 145. Id. at 205–06. 
 146. Id. at 222. 
 147. Hansen, supra note 36, at 81. 
 148. Id. at 93–94. 
 149. Id. at 94. 
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Business groups, though, appear to have an additional advantage. 
They tend to be able to coopt the government to support their efforts.150 
During war time, Hansen points out, industry groups are boosted dramat-
ically by government efforts to co-opt producers into the war efforts. 
These periods tend to be highly profitable, and long lasting for building 
and maintaining organizational structure, for industry groups.151 
The work on incentives demonstrates that some latent interests can 
overcome the collective-action problem. However, none of this work 
suggests that latent interests are able to overcome the natural ability of 
business interests to organize. Furthermore, as will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section, even where the collective-action problem is 
solved, evidence shows that group managers often do not reflect the ma-
jority interest of the members. Different interest distortions occur in dif-
ferent types of groups. The general finding is that wealthy donors often 
set the agenda of an interest group. This finding holds even in the case of 
business interests. This next section looks at this important matter. 
3. Wealthy Interests Tend to Aid in the Formation of Many Groups 
Many interest groups solve the collective-action problem through 
the contributions of wealthy individuals or entities. These high-wealth 
individuals or entities provide significantly larger sums than the average 
member.152 Although this solution to the collective-action problem is 
more prevalent among citizen groups, business interests often solve the 
collective-action problem through wealthy interests as well.153 These 
wealthy contributors tend to substantially influence the direction of the 
group. Fundraisers often live by a rule that 80% to 90% of support of an 
organization will come from 10% to 20% of the contributors.154 This 
appears true for business leagues as well. These organizations tend to 
rely on a few loyalists for their support.155 In the trade association con-
text, for instance, member dues are often paid on a sliding-scale basis 
such that large corporations pay the predominant portion of member 
dues.156 
Jack Walker found that that sale of selective incentives simply 
could not explain the explosion of citizen interest groups in the 1970s.157 
While some of that growth could be explained by the selective-incentives 
  
 150. Hansen, supra note 36, at 93–94. 
 151. Id.; see also AINSWORTH, supra note 42, at 27 (stating that government involvement with 
trade associations in the early twentieth century was often associated with getting a more technocrat-
ic result instead of following the politics of spoils). 
 152. See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 32.  
 153. See Michael L. Barnett, One Voice, But Whose Voice? Exploring What Drives Trade 
Association Activity, 52 BUS. & SOC’Y 213, 219 (2012).  
 154. L. PETER EDLES, FUNDRAISING: HANDS-ON TACTICS FOR NONPROFIT GROUPS 11 (1993). 
 155. BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 37, at 32. 
 156. WALKER, supra note 90, at 83–84. 
 157. Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 390, 396 (1983). 
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theory of Olson,158 Walker found that many groups located important 
new sources of funds outside their membership.159 In fact, 89% of the 
citizen groups received outside sources of funds, while only 34% of 
business associations did.160 Walker found that the citizen groups over-
whelmingly received their funds from wealthy patrons.161 However, his 
data showed that they are an important source for all of the interest group 
sectors including business interests.162 Additionally, the citizen group 
beliefs overwhelmingly tracked the political beliefs of the wealthy pa-
trons.163 Others have found highly similar results with respect to trade 
associations as well.164 
Recent research has confirmed the large influence of wealth also on 
our country’s policy choices. While no one has been able to conclusively 
prove that interest groups controlled by wealthy interests have caused 
this state of affairs, several authors marshal evidence demonstrating the 
dominating role that business elites play in shaping public policy and the 
agendas of our two major political parties.165 Other authors claim that the 
process works to make the rich richer.166 Martin Gilens recently demon-
strated that our government policy choices are “strongly tilted toward the 
most affluent citizens.”167 While in his recent book he did not attribute 
the cause of that tilt to any substantial interest group role,168 a more re-
cent article seems to support the biased pluralism model described 
above.169 We should not be surprised at this. Recent research shows that 
wealthier individuals are much more likely to vote, contribute to cam-
paigns, and engage in the political process than all other less-wealthy 
cohorts.170 Nevertheless, it is a cause for concern regarding the health of 
our democracy.  
This Section challenged the pluralist argument that subsidizing any 
and all groups is a good thing. Not all groups face the same challenges in 
organizing and maintaining status. Some groups find the challenge to 
organize much harder than others. The evidence shows that business 
interests have had the least difficulty in organizing. Furthermore, evi-
  
 158. For instance, the AARP succeeds in part by selling a lot of insurance. Id. 
 159. Id. at 398. 
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 164. Barnett, supra note 155, at 219. 
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 166. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 19 (2010). 
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 170. See SCHLOZMAN, VERBA & BRADY, supra note 105, at 21–22. 
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dence that organizations form at a greater rate than Olson predicted does 
not undermine the central instinct that many latent public interests face 
much greater challenges to organize than do business interests. Finally, 
even when organized, we can expect that the views expressed by the 
group will not mimic the majority interests of members, but will instead 
mimic the interests of the wealthy few. 
C. Importance of Groups 
None of this is to say that the joining of groups is a bad thing. Nor 
does this Article make the claim that business leagues serve no useful or 
important purpose. Comparative studies have shown that a significant 
sector of publically available organizations is essential to a healthy de-
mocracy.171 Voluntary organizations have been shown to be a great edu-
cator of Americans in how the democratic process works.172 Voluntary 
organizations tend to promote a greater participation in that process.173 
Additionally, these organizations, including those supporting business 
interests bring important information to legislators and agency officials. 
For instance, as Schlozman, Verba, and Brady note, “Organizations are 
particularly likely to be in a position to provide expert information that is 
useful in the formulation of policy.”174 In the 1920s and 30s for instance, 
before our country had built a substantial bureaucracy, the U.S. looked to 
trade associations and professional associations over governmental 
agents for technocratic expertise.175 Many thought more highly of the 
technical expertise of the trade associations than the often highly partisan 
government officials.176 
These last ideas are consistent with the “informational theory” of in-
terest groups, which suggests that you typically find interest groups on 
both sides of an issue.177 Additionally, interest groups are more effective 
when they provide useful reliable information to legislators.178 Under the 
informational theory, interest groups that provide bad information will 
not succeed.179 Thus, under the informational theory, we should expect 
most interest groups to provide useful information to legislators without 
imposing any particular restrictions on their actions. This work supports 
a claim that interest groups play a real and useful role in government. 
  
 171. See GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE 300–01 (1963). 
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This Article does not question the informational theory of interest 
groups. It accepts that interest groups, including business leagues, fulfill 
this important informational role. This Article contends instead that be-
cause of the significant bias in favor of business interests in the interest 
group sector, a subsidy should not be provided to the business interest 
group sector. 
D. Conclusion 
As Schattschneider said, the interest group system appears to sing 
with a distinctly “upper-class bias.”180 The evidence to date demonstrates 
that business interest groups overwhelmingly dominate the voices that 
are heard on Capital Hill. Tax exemption provides a subsidy to these 
business interests through § 501(c)(6). Based on the evidence of such a 
significant bias towards business, a subsidy is entirely unjustified. 
II. QUALIFYING AS A TAX-EXEMPT BUSINESS LEAGUE AND THE 
RATIONALES FOR SUCH EXEMPTION 
Although there is no legislative history, the exemption for business 
leagues appears in the Income Tax Act of 1913.181 It seems to originate 
from a Chamber of Commerce request to exempt “civic and commercial” 
organizations.182 “Commercial” organizations, the Chamber told Con-
gress, are not “selfish,” perform “civic functions,” and work to improve 
commerce in the interest of all citizens.183 To tax these organizations 
would be to limit their public usefulness. The Chamber argued that civic 
and commercial organizations should not be taxed for the same “com-
mon sense” reason many argue charities should not be taxed—they pro-
vide a public benefit in return for the subsidy of exemption.184 Contem-
poraneous documents suggest that the government was very open to the 
idea that these trade organizations played an important public role at the 
time.185 
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A. Qualifying for Exemption as a Business League 
The statute exempts from federal income tax “[b]usiness leagues, 
chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or profes-
sional football leagues.”186 To qualify as a business league, the Treasury 
regulations provide that an organization must be formed to promote a 
common business interest and must direct its activities towards the im-
provement of business conditions in one or more lines of business as 
distinguished from the performance of particular services for individual 
persons.187 For instance, a business league cannot promote one product 
among a lot of products that are operating in one line of business, such as 
a particular brand of auto-part.188 To maintain tax exemption, a business 
league may neither perform specific services for its members as a prima-
ry activity189 nor “engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily car-
ried on for profit.”190 Consistent with the rest of the tax-exempt sector, 
the Code explicitly prohibits business leagues from organizing for profit 
and from allowing earnings to inure to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual.191 
Unlike a charitable organization, whose political campaign activity 
is absolutely prohibited and lobbying limited,192 a business league may 
lobby as a primary purpose and may advocate for a candidate as long as 
it is not the organization’s primary purpose.193 In fact, lobbying and in-
fluencing politics is generally a primary function of a business league. 
Under the law of tax-exempt organizations, to intervene in a campaign 
means to advocate for or against a candidate for public office directly or 
indirectly.194 Lobbying, on the other hand, refers to either directly con-
  
the establishment of conventions, and efforts to bring about civic improvements. Id. at 3–4. The 
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tacting, or encouraging people to contact, legislators to vote for or 
against certain legislation.195  
Courts interpret the term “business” in § 501(c)(6) broadly. For in-
stance, the Tax Court has stated that the term business “embraces every-
thing about which a person can be employed.”196 Thus, industry, manu-
facturing, and retail are included within the term business, as is any pro-
fession, such as the medical profession.197 Although non-professional 
workers could have been included within the term business as well, as 
could have farm-related business interests, these groups have a separate 
section dedicated to them under the Code.198 The IRS has accepted that 
even students of a particular profession can form an organization devoted 
to promoting business.199 A hobby, however, rather than a strict business 
does not qualify.200  
The IRS and courts also interpret “promote” in § 501(c)(6) liberally. 
For instance, hosting lunch meetings to discuss business-related issues 
qualifies,201 although simply providing facilities for members for lunch 
does not.202 Networking to exchange business prospect information does 
not promote common business interests either.203 Publishing a newspaper 
related to the interests of fisherman,204 establishing a trust for the purpose 
of collecting, administering and disbursing funds to business leagues,205 
and holding semi-annual meetings to discuss technical problems with 
information data sharing206 all qualify as valid activities to promote a 
common business interest. A business league that issues a “seal of ac-
ceptance” highlighting that the league approves of member products 
qualifies.207 Similarly, an organization that creates a model building and 
construction code, and tests products, is considered to be conducting a 
suitable activity.208 Negotiating with labor on behalf of industry is a valid 
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activity to promote a common business interest.209 Finally, “working for 
the enactment of legislation designed to improve their competitive stand-
ing in the various lines of business, industry, etc., in which they are en-
gaged” is a perfectly fine activity for a business league.210 
There are limitations placed on a business league’s ability to sell se-
lective services to its members. As mentioned above, a business league 
may not provide goods and services exclusively to members. For in-
stance, the American Automobile Association, an association of individ-
ual car owners, failed to qualify as a business league because its activity 
was to provide services solely to members.211 However, there are some 
seemingly contradictory rulings in this area. In the seal of acceptance 
ruling above, the IRS ruled that this service to members was a legitimate 
business-league activity because the vast majority of the industry (over 
90%) participated in the particular business league at issue.212 That said, 
there seems to be an ambiguous requirement that member income be at a 
“meaningful level.”213 This is probably to ensure that the organization is 
broadly acting on behalf of the particular business or industry rather than 
running a for-profit business. In a General Counsel Memorandum 
(GCM) the Office of the Chief Counsel of the IRS (Chief Counsel) 
opined that an organization that received a significant source of its in-
come from the sale of insurance could not qualify as a business league 
because it lacked enough member support.214 An organization that pro-
vides rebates to members but not non-members also fails to qualify as a 
business league.215 
Operating for private businesses alone is prohibited. The Supreme 
Court has found that Treasury regulations establishing a line of business 
requirement are valid.216 This means a business league cannot be estab-
lished for a particular brand name product or service. The business 
league must be formed to support the general product or the service. The 
seminal case is National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States.217 
There, a business league established to support the Midas brand of muf-
fler failed to satisfy the line-of-business requirement as established by 
long-held Treasury regulations because it supported one brand rather 
than the line of business involved.218 The Court relied substantially on 
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the submitted testimony of the U.S. Chamber regarding why business 
leagues should be considered exempt from taxation on the enactment of 
the original exemption for business leagues in 1913.219 A line of business 
in most cases according to the Court involves “either an entire industry 
or all components of an industry within a geographic area.”220 The IRS 
recently won a case against Bluetooth Sig, Inc., the maker of a remote 
technology, because it was formed to support the Bluetooth product ra-
ther than the product in general.221 The Bluetooth court found that the 
difference between the trademark involved in American Plywood and the 
trademark involved in Bluetooth was that Bluetooth expressly created 
this new business opportunity rather than coming upon a business that 
was actively engaged by numerous organizations already.222 
Finally, and seemingly redundantly, a business league can go astray 
by engaging in a business for profit or performing particular services for 
its members. While these two requirements seem to collapse into the 
other factors already discussed, they are independent requirements iden-
tified by courts and the regulations. For instance, advertising on behalf of 
members will generally be considered to be the performance of a particu-
lar service for members and not support that the organization is orga-
nized for exempt purposes.223 However, where an organization advertises 
broadly on behalf of the industry, there is no particular service being 
provided to a member. A commodity and stock exchange created for 
members224 and the creation of a laundry business for members are both 
examples of prohibited particular services as well as the operation of a 
business for profit.225 The IRS has stated that the legal question is wheth-
er the activity or service “relieves the member of the necessity of secur-
ing the service commercially (or performing the service on an individual 
basis) in order to properly conduct the member’s business, resulting in a 
convenience or economy to the member.”226 
B. Difference Between Tax Exemption/Taxable for Business Leagues? 
A business league is generally an incorporated entity.227 Therefore 
an exemption from income tax means that it does not have to pay the 
corporate income tax.228 The amount of any subsidy provided is equal to 
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the tax the corporation would have owed. An exempt organization is 
broadly responsible for the unrelated business income tax under §§ 511–
514, but it only owes that tax if it incurs unrelated business income.229 
The corporate tax is a tax on an organization’s income, i.e., generally 
revenue less ordinary and necessary business expenses. In the absence of 
tax exemption, there are three primary types of income upon which a 
business league might pay tax: (1) net investment income (portfolio in-
come), (2) income from member dues, and (3) income from the sale of 
goods and services to members and nonmembers. In each case, to deter-
mine income, expenses are offset against the revenue from these activi-
ties. 
The first type of income and the tax owed is fairly straightforward. 
A business league does not pay tax on income from gains from  stocks 
and bonds, rental income, royalties and other passive investments that are 
excluded from Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT).230 Tax exemp-
tion for investment income works just like an individual’s pension plan. 
Earnings from capital held by the exempt organization are exempt from 
tax.231 Such income would generally be taxed at the corporate rate.232 If, 
after deductions, a business league earned $1,000 in investment income, 
assuming a 36% rate, it would owe $360. Because, unlike most other 
corporations, a business league is absolved from this tax, the government 
can be seen to provide a subsidy to a business league equal to the tax rate 
multiplied by investment income. Here that amount would be $360. The 
benefits most likely accrue to the members who control the organization. 
The research in Part I(B)(3) would suggest this means that the benefits 
flow most to the highest paying members of the organization whose in-
terests the organization most typically follows. 
The second type of income, membership income, lacks the clarity 
found in net investment income. Many argue, as discussed in the para-
graph below, that member dues do not represent income at all, but only 
the pooling of resources. Defining membership income requires us to 
determine what it means to be a member of a nonprofit organization. A 
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member pays business league dues because the business league provides 
some good or service that the member values at least as much as he paid 
in dues. From this perspective, a member is a customer of an entity in 
which the member has some part interest. And, if the business league is a 
corporate entity separate from its members, which presumably it is, and 
the membership dues are not the purchase of shares of stock but the ac-
quisition of goods or services, then any retained earnings from dues 
payments at the end of a taxable year represent income from membership 
dues. The dues represent the prepayment for goods or services to be re-
ceived throughout the year. If this is our perspective of a member, the 
taxation is not very difficult for our income tax system. The subsidy here 
would be the tax rate times the income exempted from tax. 
Some conceive of membership dues as simply the pooling of capital 
to do something the member could have done without the organiza-
tion.233 For example, a member might pool capital with other members to 
cooperatively advertise their common interest. Thus, some argue that 
there is no taxable activity involved in the membership dues situation.234 
This view ignores the entity and views the relationship as nothing more 
than a conduit. This is a plausible frame through which to view the rela-
tionship between member and organization. First, in almost all cases a 
member of a business league is engaged in a trade or business and would 
be able to deduct the amount of money that the business league ultimate-
ly expends.235 Thus, although paying the business league allows the 
member an immediate deduction, this is the correct result for the vast 
majority of membership dues payments. For those portions that it is the 
incorrect result, i.e., the member gets a deduction associated with an 
amount that would not have been deductible until some later year, this 
aberration results in a tax deferral only rather than complete exemp-
tion.236 Likewise, the business league itself would also be able to deduct 
most expenditures of the organization at the end of the day. Nevertheless, 
this view takes an odd view of the normal view regarding an entity indi-
vidual relationship. The two are normally treated as separate persons.237 
And, even in the case of cooperatives or partnerships, where the entity at 
times is ignored, the business league exemption choice ignores both the 
entity and the individual level of tax responsibility. 
Finally, the third source of income, payments received from con-
ducting a trade or business, may be currently taxed under the Unrelated 
Business Income Tax (UBIT) regime or may be exempt as a substantially 
related trade or business.238 For instance, if an organization sells a seal of 
  
 233. For a discussion of this idea, see Halperin, supra note 9, at 134. 
 234. E.g., id. at 139, 155–56.  
 235. See, e.g., id. at 135. 
 236. Id. 
 237.  Moline Props. v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
 238. 26 U.S.C. § 513. 
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approval to members and nonmembers and the IRS determines the sale 
of that seal is substantially related to the organization’s exempt purpose, 
the business league will not owe UBIT on the income from that service. 
However, where the business league sells advertising to particular mem-
bers, the business league will owe the UBIT on this income for that tax 
year. 
Payments to a tax-exempt business league are not deductible as a 
charitable contribution, as are donations to a charitable organization;239 
however, most payments to a business league are deductible as a trade or 
business expense.240 Membership dues are generally deductible, except to 
the extent any amount is used to lobby or intervene in a political cam-
paign.241 From a casual perusal of business league Form 990s it appears 
that business leagues do not indicate a large percentage of their expenses 
go to either advocating for or against a candidate or for lobbying.242 This 
seems odd given the research above suggesting that a primary driver for 
the creation of business leagues is in order to lobby. Further research into 
this matter might be fruitful. 
To see the impact of taxing a business league, consider what would 
happen if a business league, call it the American Barbell Association 
(ABC), gives up its exemption from tax and chooses to be taxed as a 
corporation.243 ABC speaks for the benefit of the barbell industry. It en-
gages in the following transactions. It receives $1,000,000 in dues annu-
ally from 1,000 members. It also earns $100,000 in revenue from the sale 
of a seal of approval for well-made barbells. Finally, it holds a $500,000 
endowment of stocks and bonds upon which it earns a 10% return or 
$50,000. Thus, it receives a total of $1,150,000 in revenue. Its deductions 
amount to $900,000 for speaking for the industry for the year, $50,000 of 
  
 239. Id. § 170(a)(1). 
 240. Id. § 162(a). 
 241. Id. § 162(e)(1)(A)–(D). 
 242. For instance, the US Chamber of Commerce indicates on its 2012 Form 990 that of its 
$207 million of expenses, only $13 million was dedicated to lobbying. Chamber of Commerce 2012 
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regime. A cooperative provides a hybrid regime. It is incorporated and owes a corporate tax. How-
ever, it is allowed to deduct patronage dividends such that any earnings that are distributed to mem-
bers are not taxed at the corporate level. Subchapter T of the Code would likely apply to most busi-
ness leagues that chose to be taxed as a cooperative. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.  
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which it reports as lobbying. It spends $90,000 in administering its seal 
of approval program. Finally, it incurs $10,000 in deductible expenses in 
managing its portfolio. Thus it incurs $1,000,000 in total expenses. 
ABC earned $40,000 in our first type of identified income, invest-
ment income. If it were tax exempt, it would not owe tax on this money. 
ABC’s member income would equal $100,000.244 If it were tax-exempt, 
the Association would not owe tax on that amount. Finally, with respect 
to our third type of income, ABC earned $10,000 from the sale of the 
seal of approval. Assuming an even corporate tax rate of 30%, ABC 
would owe $12,000 on its investment income, $30,000 in taxes on mem-
ber income, and $3,000 in taxes on its trade or business income. It is 
possible that even as a tax-exempt entity the Association might owe tax 
on trade or business amount. It would depend on how the Association 
structured the seal of approval.245 Thus, as a taxable entity, ABC would 
pay $45,000 in taxes on $150,000 of income, while as tax exempt it 
would pay nothing or $3,000 on that same income. 
As a taxable entity, ABC could choose to spend all of its member 
dues on expenses and keep its total tax burden to the $15,000 owed on 
investment income and sales of services. It could also possibly treat the 
excess $100,000 in member dues as a rebate. In other words, ABC could 
determine that it charged its members too much and return that money. It 
would still pay tax on the remaining $50,000 of investment income and 
trade or business income. 
The incentive effect therefore of granting tax-exempt status, is to 
encourage the tax-exempt organization to not spend its earnings current-
ly; this is because it gets an advantage over others by having retained 
earnings that do not face a tax. If the organization is taxable it will be 
encouraged to either return money to its members or spend it all current-
ly. Thus, if we have reason to believe that it would be better for business 
leagues to spend its income currently we might choose instead to make 
them taxable rather than tax exempt.  
C. Propriety of Tax Exemption for Business Leagues 
Few argue business leagues deserve tax exemption. Those who have 
opined from a scholarly perspective describe exemption for these organi-
zations as “rickety.”246 Even though considered rickety, Boris Bittker and 
George Rahdert state that it might be self-defeating to tax business 
  
 244. I assume the IRS will treat a for-profit business league as if it is in the trade or business of 
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leagues.247 They point out that a business league could either be operated 
at a break-even point, incurring no taxable obligation, or could pass 
along the extra tax charge to its members who would deduct this charge 
and substantially lower their total tax obligation.248 Halperin concludes 
that tax exemption for business leagues is a subsidy but believes there is 
little harm in the subsidy to the extent it is associated with member ser-
vices.249 Its primary benefit is deferral.250  
Thus, the primary arguments for exempting business leagues from 
income tax seem to be that taxing them would be a waste of time and an 
administrative burden. This Section investigates whether there might be 
positive arguments for tax exemption for business leagues. It finds that 
there are positive arguments, but ones that are not ultimately satisfactory. 
It also concludes that the suggestion that taxing business leagues would 
be a waste of time and an administrative burden are incorrect today. 
I have argued that mutual-benefit organizations, such as business 
leagues, should generally be subject to taxation.251 I argued that under the 
shareholder theory of corporate taxation, mutual-benefit organizations 
should pay a tax to represent the private gain provided through the opera-
tion of the organization. Under corporate tax theories, the most accepted 
theory of taxation is that we tax corporate entities to tax the sharehold-
ers.252 Because the members of mutual-benefit organizations closely re-
semble the shareholders of a for-profit corporation—they control the 
organization through voting and are the primary beneficiaries of the ac-
tions of the organization—a corporate tax should apply to business 
leagues and other mutual benefits unless a strong positive case can be 
made for their exemption. Public benefit corporations, on the other hand, 
such as charitable organizations are structured to have no members who 
resemble shareholders. Thus, it is more difficult to make a positive case 
for taxation of charitable organizations under the shareholder theory of 
corporate taxation. 
Consistent with economic theory for government subsidies, and 
with the market failure theory, it arguably makes sense to provide ex-
emption to an organization that fulfills an important public purpose.253 
The most common argument made for providing an organization exemp-
tion from tax is that the organization provides some public benefit that is 
at least equal to the amount of tax the organization would have paid (the 
“quid pro quo theory”).254 The dominant argument within the quid pro 
  
 247. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 246, at 357. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Halperin, supra note 9, at 135–36. 
 250. Id. at 135. 
 251. Hackney, supra note 8, at 118. 
  252.   Id. 
 253. See id. at 125–26, 155. 
 254. See, e.g., id. at 125. 
298 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:2  
quo theory holds that we provide a subsidy to nonprofit organizations 
that solve a market failure.255 Typically, the type of market failure in-
volved is either (1) a good or service that has positive externalities or (2) 
a public good. No one has explicitly argued that a business league solves 
a market failure. Nevertheless, there are three market failures, or perhaps 
government failures, that subsidizing business leagues might solve: (1) it 
might foster a pluralist society, (2) it might ensure that needed, useful, 
truthful information is delivered to the government, and (3) it might pro-
vide a private regulatory authority (think bar association). 
Some make a positive argument for tax exemption.256 They argue 
tax exemption fosters a pluralist society. By subsidizing the formation of 
groups that will advocate for societal interests we enhance our democra-
cy. Encouraging the formation of groups can help to ensure all interests 
of our nation are represented before our government, and can bring us 
closer to an ideal representative democracy. 
 This pluralism theory must be based on the assumption that there is 
a market failure associated with the collective good of governmental 
interest representation. As discussed in Part I above, this is the collective 
action problem; although there are many needs of individuals and organ-
izations that could be fulfilled by government, the cost involved in seek-
ing the fulfillment of that need by government is more costly than the 
return to any one individual. While it would be in the collective interest 
to organize to spread the cost of speaking to the government, the cost of 
such organization is often so great compared to the return that some indi-
viduals and groups might never organize. Other collective interests might 
organize, but might never get the optimal amount of this service because 
many individuals and organizations will free ride on the efforts of others. 
Thus the basis for this positive case: the subsidy of tax exemption can 
encourage the development of organizations that represent diverse im-
portant views before the government.257 This can enhance the democratic 
nature of government. We might further enhance the power of this claim 
by noting that this subsidy is best suited to nonprofit organizations. The 
absence of owners who might act opportunistically in a nonprofit means 
nonprofits are more trustworthy than a for-profit organization and thus 
worthy of the government subsidy.258  
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This represents a prescriptive pluralism. It recommends that the 
government give aid to organizations that will represent group interests 
before the government. The positive externality presumably from such 
activity is that the government will be more democratic because it is 
more inclusive of the diverse opinions of society. 
A related positive case, which I refer to as the information theory, is 
also based on the problem of collective action. Under this theory the sub-
sidy encourages the collective action of organizations to provide the gov-
ernment with important, necessary information.259 Neither legislators nor 
government employees can know all the information they need to man-
age the complex regulatory world. In the early 1900s, in fact, there was a 
sense that our government should seek out substantial help from these 
associational groups to scientifically govern commerce.260 Furthermore, 
interest groups possess valuable electoral information for those running 
for election.261 It is theoretically possible that interest groups could help 
align a politician’s position more closely with the electorate. Thus, busi-
ness leagues deserve exemption because they fill this important public 
role of bringing important, necessary information to the government. 
Again, the case for this claim could be augmented if it could be shown 
that nonprofits provide better and more truthful information. 
Finally, in some cases, some business leagues may serve an im-
portant regulatory function. This might be particularly helpful in a cir-
cumstance where that function is one that the state might have otherwise 
operated. These organizations might provide a lower cost, less intrusive 
means of regulating and ensuring the smooth operation of important pro-
fessional and industry functions. For instance, bar associations regulate 
lawyers and many industry associations may regulate the quality of 
products provided by a particular industry. As will be seen in the case 
studies below, the Cotton Trade Institute tried to serve as the arbiter of 
quality products by helping to implement a federal code governing these 
products. Also, the AMA has served a regulatory role at times by over-
seeing the quality of drugs, and is today involved in regulating payment 
structures associated with medical procedures.262 
In assessing these three related positive cases, the first step is to as-
sess whether there is a market failure that business leagues are solving. 
Arguably, the current set of requirements for business leagues that pro-
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hibit an exempt business league from operating for a particular business 
aids the case that business leagues provide a collective good that might 
be subject to market failure. Instead of helping just Midas Mufflers, any 
business league formed around mufflers must help all organizations in 
that line of business. However, as developed above in Part I, much of the 
business-league community is made up of small homogenous interests 
that appear to have little difficulty organizing.263 Thus, even though they 
provide a collective good, the type of collective good they provide does 
not appear to have the substantial market failure that is imagined in the 
theory supporting exemption from income tax. 
Nevertheless, collective action theory and the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that some business leagues face real collective-action prob-
lems. Professional associations and peak associations arguably face some 
real challenges. Mancur Olson notes the challenges that professional 
associations face in organizing because they typically represent a large 
latent interest.264 For instance, a review of the history of the American 
Medical Association seems to demonstrate that the AMA experienced 
substantial challenges in organizing prior to the turn of the twentieth 
century.265 Peak associations too, such as the Chamber of Commerce,  
face greater challenges in organizing than the small trade associations. 
Peak associations and professional associations perceive that they must 
sell selective incentives such as insurance and discounts and offer oppor-
tunities to network to attract members.266 Thus, certain sectors of busi-
ness leagues face market failure. Could this mean that there might be a 
partial positive case to be made on this market failure?  
Maybe, but we might question the extent of that market failure. 
Many professional associations, for instance, work with their states to 
establish closed shops that all but eliminate any collective-action prob-
lem.267 In order to practice law, for example, you must be a member of 
your state bar.268 If individuals are forced to join the organization by state 
compulsion, the collective-action problem is solved. This solves the col-
lective-action problem for many of the most powerful professional asso-
ciations. Thus, despite the objective challenges that professional associa-
tions face, the closed shop generally solves the market failure problem 
and there is no need for an additional subsidy to solve that problem. Ad-
ditionally, while peak associations may experience collective action chal-
lenges, those challenges are arguably not as intense as some other non-
business public interests. Business organizations typically have members 
with the skills and resources to organize. And, as demonstrated in Part I 
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above, business interests are well represented before our government 
already; under this analysis, the market failure case for these organiza-
tions that face a collective action problem becomes suspect as well.  
This assessment of the relative level of market failure faced by dif-
ferent types of business leagues suggests that examining the exemption 
worthiness of organizational types is not a hard and fast science. Differ-
ent organizational interests experience market failure over a continuum. 
On the side of extreme market failure we might place large and latent 
organizational interests, such as the poor, that experience a high degree 
of market failure. On the other end where organizational interests face 
almost no market failure, we might place trade associations representing 
an industry with few members. This continuum suggests that within the 
business-league organizational sector, some organizational types might 
be identified that are more deserving than others. For example, peak as-
sociations appear to face a greater level of market failure than industry 
trade associations and may thus be more worthy of exemption.  
If we conclude some organizational types within the business-
league sector are more deserving of exemption than others, then we need 
to know what baseline to use in measuring whether a class of organiza-
tions on the whole should be entitled to exemption from tax. Should all 
the organizations that fit within the class suffer significant, severe market 
failure? Should you compare organizations within a class, or is the rele-
vant question the degree of severity of market failure as compared to all 
other tax-exempt organizations including charitable organizations? Un-
der the current exemption structure for business leagues there are many 
trade associations that represent small interests that objectively do not 
appear to face any market failure.269 Furthermore when business interests 
are compared to the interests of the poor, the collective-action challenge 
difference is profound. 
It is hard to make an exact judgment, but if we looked at a continu-
um of nonprofit organizations that face market failure and it went from 
only a little failure to a lot of failure, we could expect that the vast major-
ity of business leagues fall on the little failure side. The overwhelming 
empirical evidence discussed above that business interests dominate the 
interest group field supports this conclusion.270 
We could stop the analysis there. If we can conclude that the vast 
majority of business leagues do not face market failure in a relative sense 
it becomes hard to suggest they need a subsidy to provide the goods or 
services we think are helpful. However, to complete the analysis we 
should assess whether, if properly targeted to the organizations within 
the business league class that does experience market failure, such as 
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peak organizations, one of the positive cases for business leagues sug-
gested above could carry the day for exemption.  In the following para-
graphs I consider the positive cases as they might apply to the organiza-
tions in the business league class that are on the more severe side of mar-
ket failure. 
The first case is an argument that the subsidy fosters a more plural-
istic society. Could the subsidy for peak business associations be sup-
ported on the premise that offering peak associations a subsidy will in-
crease the diversity of opinion brought to our government actors? Given 
the overwhelming evidence that business interests dominate the interest 
group field, such a claim seems far-fetched. As a result of the existing 
substantial bias towards business interests, providing a subsidy to busi-
ness interests likely distorts the democratic community more towards 
these powerful business interests. Thus, even if exemption were provided 
solely to peak associations, the objective of pluralism is probably harmed 
rather than enhanced. Taking into consideration the evidence that there 
are only so many interest groups that can make up an interest group sec-
tor,271 we should be doubly concerned about filling the field with inter-
ests that already dominate. 
The second case, the informational theory, is usually offered as a 
reason to not impose restrictions on lobbying generally.272 Interest groups 
bring forth important information to legislators and agency decision 
makers and we should be inclined to support those activities. Information 
from the regulated is an important good in and of itself. However, this 
rationale to be used to support exemption depends on finding market 
failure. If most business interests organize anyway, it is hard to under-
stand why we need increase the amount of information provided by this 
community. Pushing the informational theory to support subsidization of 
lobbying seems a push one step too far. 
The third positive case to support business-league exemption pre-
sents perhaps the best case because it focuses on a very public function. 
Under this case, we subsidize the business leagues that perform a public 
regulatory function by enacting and enforcing rules to govern a profes-
sion or industry’s relationship with the public and with one another. Pro-
fessional associations like bar associations enforce professional stand-
ards; likewise, some trade associations enforce building codes that may 
ensure better products for the public. The activity of regulating an im-
portant professional or industrial field fulfills a traditional governmental 
role, and we as a society generally accept that we should not tax the gov-
ernment itself. In a sense this could fit the lessening the burdens of chari-
table organizations. Thus, this exemption need not rely on market failure. 
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One could justify this case on the basis of the organization fulfilling a 
governmental role alone. 
The third case does not broadly support business-league exemption. 
A small set of business leagues fulfills this public regulatory role. The 
strongest objection to this case is the evidence that this type of activity is 
really a byproduct of the primary activity of acting as an interest group 
on behalf of the industry.273 Thus, these private associations will continue 
to pressure government actors to provide a better environment for their 
industry as a whole. The fact that these organizations get the state’s im-
primatur to regulate the industry or profession simply makes the voice of 
these organizations even more powerful. This is seen quite clearly in the 
case study below on the development of the AMA and to a certain extent 
the Cotton Textile Institute as well. Given that the regulatory function is 
a byproduct of business interests, this case should thus fail as well. 
Although no positive case supports tax exemption, might we still 
choose to exempt the business league from the income tax because (1) it 
does not matter whether we tax these organizations or not, and (2) it 
would be an administrative burden anyway? Taxing business leagues 
would not likely lead to substantial revenue, and it is true that a part of 
the subsidy consists of accelerated deductions for members. However, 
the casual acceptance of exempting an organization because it will not 
likely lead to much revenue seems misguided. It is important that in our 
income tax system we keep a narrow list of organizational types entitled 
to exemption, as the greater the number of organizations that do not have 
to pay tax, the higher the tax rate must be for everyone else. Furthermore, 
the federal tax-exempt status is a signal good that provides to its owner 
many other valuable benefits. Many states and local authorities grant tax 
exemptions to organizations simply because the federal government pro-
vides exemption. After a while this can add up to significant money. A 
change at the federal level might encourage some states and local gov-
ernments to lessen other subsidies provided to these undeserving organi-
zations.  
Today, it is hard to imagine that it is administratively more conven-
ient to place business leagues into the tax-exempt category rather than 
the taxable category. For the organizations, the regulatory environment 
has become deeply complex and costly. The Form 990, the informational 
return for tax-exempt organizations, demands significant attention and 
the organization must manage to steer clear through an increasingly more 
complex tax-exempt regulatory landscape.  
As for the administrative burden of the IRS, the resources of the 
IRS in its exempt organization division are inadequate to accomplish its 
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current level of work.274 Also, recent experience at the IRS suggests that 
the IRS is not a good agency to task with making political decisions.275 
The IRS faced serious political trouble for examining whether certain 
conservative organizations applying to be exempt as § 501(c)(4) social 
welfare organizations were engaged in too much politics.276 Business 
leagues, like social welfare organizations, may similarly not primarily 
advocate for candidates.277 Thus, the rules regarding these organizations 
put the IRS in a bad position politically. If they enforce the requirement, 
the IRS can do damage to its reputation. If the IRS does not enforce the 
requirement, it can do damage to its reputation as well. Eliminating busi-
ness-league tax exemption would reduce the number of situations in 
which the IRS is in significant political danger. Eliminating the necessity 
of the IRS in making that political call would remove one problematic 
law that it must enforce. 
Finally, as noted above, there are some who contend that business 
leagues simply pool assets.278 Members of a business league are simply 
collectively providing services each member could provide on their own; 
business leagues should therefore not be subject to extra tax on individu-
al activity.279 This argument seems to be based on a claim that the trade 
associations are nothing more than a conduit. The argument assumes that 
the organization should bear no tax because there is no realization event 
when a member pays dues and a business league provides a service. A 
member is simply putting his money in another pocket.  
The first difficulty with this assertion is that it would only apply to 
the charge for member dues. Investment income and income from the 
sale of services to nonmembers would not be sheltered under this idea. 
No member could avoid a tax on that income. However, tax exemption 
for business leagues treats both these forms of income as exempt.  
As to the question of member dues, a review of the collective action 
literature establishes the importance and political usefulness of the col-
lective activity in and of itself. The importance of carrying out business-
league activity in a collective sense makes it hard to conclude that busi-
ness leagues are simply engaging in activities that the members could 
perform on their own. The very purpose of collective action is to accom-
plish goals that individual members could not accomplish on their own. 
Some scholars following a similar thread to the pooling claim note 
that if the organization had to pay tax on its retained earnings it might 
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simply zero out its income every year.280 A business league could for 
instance issue a refund to its members on the premise that it charged too 
much earlier in the year. Effectively, this is the argument that it is admin-
istratively convenient to treat business-league activity as tax-exempt. The 
administratively efficient claim has already been handled above. Howev-
er, I believe there would be no harm in encouraging these organizations 
to spend currently. It would ensure that the organization was not building 
up a war chest to fight future battles aided in part from a subsidy from 
the government. 
D. Concluding Thoughts 
Ending tax exemption for these powerful organizations may be po-
litically impossible. A second best option would be to maintain tax ex-
emption but to impose a net investment income tax as is already imposed 
on other mutual-benefit nonprofit organizations, such as the social club 
under § 501(c)(7) and the political organization under § 527. This would 
mean that of the three types of income, only net investment income 
would be taxed. Thus, while not perfect, it would be a move to slightly 
reduce the subsidy to business leagues. The Clinton administration pro-
posed this move in the late 1990s, but it was unsuccessful.281 One addi-
tional positive aspect of this move would be that it would maintain a 
right to public disclosure of business-league activities.282 We as a society 
might value that public disclosure via the Form 990 more than the taxes 
derived from member income or commercial income. Additionally, this 
move could even one day support a right to obtain disclosure regarding 
donors for political purposes based on the provision of a subsidy. This 
could aid in ensuring that the information provided by business leagues 
is more truthful and thus helpful to legislators and agencies.283 Thus, the 
strongest argument for maintaining exempt status might be to use that 
grant as a means to obtain greater information from these organizations. 
What implications might this review have for other tax-exempt or-
ganizations beyond business leagues? It has little implication for the 
charitable sector because charitable organizations are expressly prohibit-
ed from intervening in political campaigns and may only do modest 
amounts of lobbying.284 In other words, while charitable organizations 
may act as interest groups at times, their ability to do so is quite limited. 
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This analysis in fact could support these lobbying and electoral limita-
tions in part. The analysis should be quite relevant to other mutual-
benefit organizations that participate substantially in the political pro-
cess. Namely, the analysis has ramifications for both social welfare or-
ganizations,285 and labor and agricultural organizations,286 both of which 
typically act in a primary capacity as interest groups. The analysis calls 
exemption for these organizations into question as well on a presumption 
that the law gives a subsidy to many of the wrong groups that would 
have organized whether tax exemption existed or not. One could consid-
er whether exemption is warranted where a certain segment of society, 
such as the poor, or labor interests, face more severe collective action 
problems, and suffer significant political voice inequality as a result.287 
This question is beyond the scope of this Article, but I plan to turn to 
these questions in a later article. 
III. THE BUSINESS OF BUSINESS LEAGUES: THREE CASE STUDIES 
This Part describes the three main types of business leagues and us-
es three case studies to illustrate their activities. This is offered to pro-
vide more context regarding business leagues and to promote a larger 
understanding of their activities within the legal literature as it relates to 
taxation. Additionally, it provides an opportunity to test some of the ide-
as expressed above.  
There are no groups that are more engaged in the pressure group 
business than business interests.288 However, in addition to lobbying, 
business leagues collect statistics, standardize processes, institute uni-
form cost accounting, settle trade disputes, and establish codes of eth-
ics.289 Business leagues also work to “stabilize” the market, including 
sometimes engaging in price fixing.290 Typically, the most significant 
activity of a business league is as a liaison for the particular business 
interest to Congress or state and local governments.291   
Business leagues fall into three main categories: (1) peak organiza-
tions (think highly generalized business organizations such as the United 
States Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), and the National Federation of 
Independent Business (NFIB)); (2) specific industry trade associations 
(think the National Beer Wholesalers Association, the Motion Picture 
Association of America, and the National Council of Textile Organiza-
tions); and, (3) professional associations (think bar associations and med-
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ical associations that implement and monitor state-backed licensing sys-
tems and establish minimum education requirements). Each of these dif-
ferent types of business leagues provides some other service in addition 
to political influence, but all share the commonality of attempts to influ-
ence governmental policy, i.e., they are interest groups. 
A. Peak Organizations 
Peak organizations are made up of diverse interests from every 
spectrum and size of business. Their primary function tends to be to pro-
tect and enhance their members’ interests before the federal govern-
ment.292 In addition to representation, peak organizations provide some 
other selective and purposive incentives to their members, such as dis-
counts on products, subscriptions to publications, and opportunities to 
network. The Chamber, founded in 1912 at the behest of President 
Taft,293 is probably the best known peak organization. In its early itera-
tion, the leaders of the Chamber saw that its most important function was 
to obtain “the matured judgment of business on national questions and to 
present and interpret these views to the agencies of government and to 
the public.”294 Its members include both individuals and entities. It in-
cludes for-profit and nonprofit businesses in its membership.  
The Chamber, like most peak organizations, only takes a position 
on an issue when it has a supermajority of its membership interested in 
and agreed upon that issue.295 It cautiously avoids particularistic issues 
that are of interest to only parts of its membership and lets corporations 
and trade associations fight these battles instead.296 The Chamber says its 
members “count on the Chamber to be their voice in Washington, 
D.C.”297 Of all the different types of business leagues, the peak organiza-
tions appear to suffer the greatest collective-action problems likely be-
cause of the lack of homogeneity of interest—the prime commonality of 
the peak organization is the interest in business in general. 
1. National Federation of Independent Business 
The formation and operation of the NFIB is an excellent example of 
the purposes and activities of a peak organization.298 Its formation story 
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fits Salisbury’s exchange theory of interest group formation well.299 
Founded by an entrepreneur, its salesmen hawked memberships to small 
businesses around the country.300 It primarily sold purposive incentives. 
Consistent with the suggestion of Olson, we see that the NFIB  as a peak 
association appeared to face a real collective-action problem.  
The NFIB is today an organization of approximately 350,000 mem-
bers.301 It reported revenue of $103 million and expenses of $100 million 
in 2012.302 Its mission is “to organize the independent or small business 
men into an association to the end that his voice may be heard effectively 
in local, state, and national affairs affecting small business.”303 It  vigor-
ously engages with the political process. For example, it helped Republi-
cans to victory in the mid 1990s and helped to stymie Bill Clinton’s 
health reform.304 Most recently, it tried to stop the Barack Obama’s Af-
fordable Care Act.305  
C. Wilson Harder founded the NFIB in 1943 in the San Francisco 
Bay area.306 Harder, a small business owner active in the Chamber, 
formed the NFIB in response to frustration that the Chamber represented 
the interests of large businessmen rather than small businessmen.307 
World War II imposed challenges on businesses by increasing demand 
for their services while also depleting the labor force. During the war, 
after  prodding by the Chamber, the government implemented rules that 
Harder believed helped large businesses at the expense of the small busi-
nesses.308 Harder took umbrage at unfair trade practices and issues of 
distribution that he believed these rules protected and encouraged. Hard-
er believed the government implemented these rules because the small 
businessman lacked a sufficient voice in Congress.309  
To make the NFIB work, Harder believed he needed a strong sales 
model; but he made a decision to only seek members from independent 
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businesses that did not dominate a field.310 He sold small businessmen 
the right to effective representation in Washington D.C. In addition to 
representation before Congress, the NFIB provided a newsletter to its 
members called the Mandate.311 With one lobbyist in Washington, Hard-
er kept a lean policy staff but employed a large sales force that extended 
over 200 districts across the country.312 Entitled to a 50% commission on 
first year dues, the sales force, not unsurprisingly, aggressively recruited 
members.313 
The sales force recruited members using the anger harbored by 
many smaller businessmen toward the government from post-New Deal 
programs that privileged large firms over small.314 In the opinion of 
many small businessmen, the large firms set all industry-wide codes and 
those codes were set intentionally to assist large industry to the detriment 
of independent business.315 To sell NFIB membership, salesmen would 
bring a copy of the newsletter Mandate to the small businessmen they 
visited.316 The Mandate conducted a monthly poll of its members on an 
issue important to small businessmen.317 In the poll it provided the mem-
bers the pros and cons on the issue that it was polling.318 The organiza-
tion would then share the results of these polls with congressmen to at-
tempt to sway them.319 While this model was successful at enrolling 
members, the NFIB experienced a high membership turnover rate. 320 
Harder focused on sales, while the NFIB lobbyist represented the 
organization in Washington D.C.321 The lobbyist, George Burger, had a 
strong connection to the National Association of Independent Tire Deal-
ers.322 Burger pushed the NFIB to advocate the issues that concerned 
independent tire dealers—namely issues surrounding an anti-monopoly 
position.323 Burger ignored opportunities for war contracts for small 
businessmen, and problems with the consolidation of small manufactur-
ers.324  
The NFIB developed a model of influence based on providing ef-
fective polling of constituents.325 The evidence, however, does not show 
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that the effort had tremendous impact on legislation. Even the small 
business legislation that was passed, the Small Business Act of 1953 
(SBA), did not have the backing of NFIB.326 Although the SBA did spec-
ify a pro-small-businessman policy, the NFIB strongly preferred that 
small businessmen be able to appeal directly to Congress rather than 
have to work through a governmental agency to influence policy. Never-
theless, Congress established the Small Business Administration any-
way.327 This happened in spite of some opposition from the small busi-
ness lobby.328 Because the NFIB had little interest in the bill, the bill 
ended up being drafted to satisfy the interests of members of Congress 
rather than the interests of the members of the NFIB.329 In the 1980s the 
NFIB helped to dismantle the program.330 
With the death of Harder in 1968, the organization changed its lob-
bying efforts.331 It instituted systems to keep track of congress members’ 
votes and conspicuously recognized those members who supported the 
organization’s positions.332 The NFIB showed its strength in the early 
1990s in the battle over President Clinton’s planned health care over-
haul.333 Knowing that they had most Republican’s on board, the NFIB 
went after Democrats in their districts. They hosted meetings in the dis-
tricts of the targeted Democrats to put them on the spot regarding how 
they would vote on healthcare.334 The NFIB quickly won the support of 
Max Baucus, an influential Democratic senator from Montana.335 They 
managed to be one of the main groups to have stopped the Clinton health 
plan momentum.336 They did this by applying local pressure to targeted 
congressmen. 
The NFIB quickly became, and appears to continue to be, closely 
aligned with the Republican Party. The NFIB recruits candidates, funds 
candidates, and encourages its members to vote for these candidates on 
an election day.337 It continues to rely on a strong sales effort to attract 
members but also sells some selective incentives, such as insurance, fi-
nancial services deals, and human resources support.338 It appears, 
though, to rely heavily on the sale of purposive incentives. Judging from 
its continued partisan stance, such as being the primary plaintiff in the 
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major case against Obamacare,339 its members appear to join because of 
the strong free-market stance they see the organization take.  
The NFIB raised $86 million of its $103 million in revenue in 2012 
from membership fees.340 It has historically earned most of its money 
through these membership fees.341 Until 2010 its largest single donation 
from a group outside its membership was $21,000.342 In 2010, though, 
and the years following, it received larger contributions such as a $3.7 
million contribution from Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS.343 The NFIB 
also earned about $2 million in investment income and around $5 million 
from a combination of advertising, affiliate management income, and 
sponsorship income.344 Presumably some of these amounts are from the 
various products and services, i.e., selective incentives, the NFIB makes 
available on its website such as discounts on business and financial ser-
vices, insurance, and HR support for its members.345 In 2012 the NFIB 
acknowledged $65,000 in political expenditures to support candidates, 
and spent $44 million of its $100 million to lobby Congress and other 
legislative bodies.346  
The following is an extremely rough, non-scientific, attempt at de-
termining whether the NFIB has solved its collective-action problem. 
The Small Business Administration estimates that there are 23 million 
small businesses in the United States347 and the NFIB counts around 
350,000 members. If we made a likely incorrect assumption that none of 
those 350,000 members represented double counting for any business, 
then NFIB enrolled about 1.5% of its potential audience.348 This could 
suggest that the NFIB faces a real collective-action problem. Perhaps 
though, it is possible to view the NFIB’s audience differently than all 
small businesses. Unlike the Chamber, the NFIB adopts a strident politi-
cal stance; thus, the NFIB’s potential members are drawn from a much 
smaller set. Given the strident stance, it is possible that the total possible 
audience that the NFIB appeals to is some smaller fraction of those 23 
million small businesses. Some estimate that obtaining more than 5% of 
a relevant group suggests the collective-action problem has been 
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solved.349 If it turned out that the NFIB only appealed to 25% of the 
small business audience, this would represent 6% of the desired audi-
ence. Determining whether an organization has solved a collective-action 
problem depends on the group you determine it is trying to appeal to. In 
any case, it has been quite successful as a peak association at raising 
money and accomplishing some real results with its 350,000 members. 
B. Trade Associations 
Trade associations represent the interests of the owners and manag-
ers of industries like car manufacturers or textile mills. In addition to 
organizing to minimize competition in their line of business, industry 
players form trade associations to lobby government for beneficial laws 
and to stop the government from harming industry interests. Just like 
peak associations, trade associations formed in greatest numbers during 
times of legislative change and during war. In the case study below you 
will see the cotton trade organizing to fight labor laws it found harmful 
to industry interests. Additionally they formed to obtain government as-
sistance to scientifically manage the output of the industry to reduce 
what they perceived as harmful competition. 
In 1921 Emmett Naylor reported that there were about 1,000 trade 
associations in the United States.350 They have grown significantly since 
that time, although an exact number is hard to obtain. We have IRS data 
on the total number of business leagues, but we do not have a breakdown 
of how many trade associations there are within that group. In 2012 the 
IRS indicated that there were around 64,000 total business leagues regis-
tered with the IRS.351 
1. Cotton Textile Institute  
Louis Galambos provides a case study on the formation, activity, 
and maintenance of a national trade association by tracing the origins of 
the Cotton Textile Institute.352 The overwhelming message is that trade 
associations form to stabilize the business of the current industry players. 
Northern and southern cotton firms competed mightily in the late 1800s 
and the industry players saw this competition as disastrous to the indus-
try. While the industry appears never to have been successful in stabiliz-
ing, its organizing effort led to some fairly significant lobbying success.  
The Cotton Textile Institute began with loose associations at a re-
gional level. Three organizations, two in the northeast and one in the 
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south, stand out: the New England Cotton Manufacturers Association 
and the Arkwright Club in the northeast, and the Southern Cotton Spin-
ners Association in the south.353  
The New England Cotton Manufacturers Association was the first 
to form in 1865 in the wake of the Civil War as the cotton industry faced 
significant technological change and increase in demand.354 Mill agents 
sought an opportunity to commune with other agents to stay on top of 
rapidly changing technological developments.355 Starting with forty 
agents in 1865, the organization grew to almost 500 individual members 
in twenty different states, including the north and the south.356 It con-
tained almost all of the mills in New England.357 Until the late 1800s it 
operated with almost no staff and little money.358 For those forty years it 
primarily operated as a gathering place of cotton mill operators seeking 
to share technological information at formally arranged dinners and con-
ferences.359 In the 1890s, some members sought to use the Association as 
the political voice of the mills, but this effort was shot down.360 
Only the leading mill manufacturers formed the Arkwright Club in 
1880.361 These manufacturers intended to engage in “concerted action” to 
protect the interests of the mills.362 The leading cause of the formation of 
the Club appears to be legislation in Massachusetts limiting the work 
hours of women and children.363 The Arkwright started with a limit of 
fifty members who had to be officers; it grew to 114 members by 
1900.364 The Arkwright was well financed by members who came pri-
marily from the older, larger, more established mills.365 It imposed a 
charge on the payroll amount of member mills, which allowed the Ark-
wright to develop a professional staff by the 1890s.366 Its primary pur-
pose was to lobby.367 
Over dinner, Arkwright members would determine the position they 
should take on state or federal legislation.368 Members themselves han-
dled most of the lobbying; the Arkwright at this time would only occa-
sionally hire an agent to lobby on its behalf.369 In addition to lobbying, 
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the members attempted to stabilize prices in the industry by establishing 
“curtailment programs” and sharing price lists.370 
The southern organization was later to organize; the cotton textile 
industry began in the northeast and only later moved to the south.371 Alt-
hough loose affiliations formed from time to time in the south, they typi-
cally folded quickly.372 In 1897, with anemic participation, forty cotton 
manufacturers from the south formed the Southern Cotton Spinners As-
sociation.373 Made up of any officer of a mill, the organization accepted 
individual members rather than corporate memberships and thus did not 
have the money of an Arkwright.374 The southern group focused on stabi-
lizing the industry through price control and product control.375 
Galambos refers to this period as the “dinner-club” period of trade 
associations.376 The primary form of organization were loosely knit 
groups that met over dinner to discuss shared issues and ideas that mem-
bers wanted to promote within the industry, and sometimes in a more 
public sense.377 Trade associations did not become sophisticated profes-
sional, staff-operated associations until the next century. In the early 
1900s this movement began as the northern mills began to experience the 
intense competition from the southern mills.378 Although World War I 
stymied competition a little because of increased opportunity for the 
trade, after the war the competition made the northern mill operations 
look dire. In a new twentieth century vision of industry cooperation the 
mills developed “stability, teamwork, and systematic controls” by work-
ing together through these associational structures 379 
Cotton textile associations also worked to counter the success of the 
progressive movement on the labor and regulatory front. In the early 
1900s the progressive movement achieved some success in opening gov-
ernment to public pressure.380 New regulatory agencies such as the Food 
and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission also made it 
necessary for business to have a larger infrastructure with skilled indi-
viduals capable of communicating to a sophisticated bureaucratic struc-
ture.381 To respond to these new forces, the cotton textile industry created 
a service association with the professional staff. The Arkwright Club and 
the New England Association both expanded and created divisions to 
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handle new needed functions; these included: dispute resolution, classifi-
cation of products, gathering of statistics, and legislative relations382 By 
1913, the organizations were able to form an interregional group to rep-
resent the entire industry.383 
During the First World War the government worked hard to organ-
ize the mills. The government used the associations to coordinate the war 
effort.384 Herbert Hoover, head of the Department of Commerce at the 
time, strongly encouraged the efforts of trade associations to stabilize 
industry through standardization of products, and to cooperate on cost 
accounting methods, all in order to improve efficiency.385 However, even 
with government help, the cotton textile mills could not cooperate to fix 
prices or limit production.386 The southern mills had a significant labor 
cost advantage and were unwilling to engage with the larger cotton tex-
tile mills.387 
In the mid 1920s the industry went into a depression; this financial 
crisis led to the formation of the Cotton Textile Institute (CTI), a national 
organization with substantial resources. The formation of this organiza-
tion was made possible by changes at the executive and judicial levels of 
government. Many policymakers, such as Herbert Hoover, believed 
strongly in the need to liberalize the US policy on antitrust.388 Addition-
ally, in the 1920s a couple decisions of the Court liberalized anti-trust 
policy and finally provided industry leeway to coordinate action and 
prices.389 These changes in ideology regarding competition at the execu-
tive and judicial level allowed the cotton textile sector to feel freer to 
seek cooperation from both the mills of the south and the north. In order 
to get the backing of the federal government, the mill owners agreed that 
this new national organization would not seek to influence legislation.390 
The CTI was founded in October 1926 to establish an open price plan in 
order to avoid producing excess capacity.391  
While today many may harbor concerns regarding price fixing, or 
even open price plans, it is interesting to consider the ingredients that the 
CTI used to accomplish these goals. These ingredients are still a major 
part of trade association work today. To accomplish the open price plan 
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the CTI had to standardize cost accounting techniques.392 They had to 
normalize the sharing of information and the coordination of product 
lines.393 These activities all helped to naturally ease the worst problems 
of excess capacity because the members now were freely sharing infor-
mation using a common language.394 A further implication though was 
that “The association programs were created to preserve an existing in-
dustrial structure which included, most prominently, the organization’s 
members.”395 In other words, this trade association worked to preserve in 
place the members of the association, and to either maintain or increase 
their respective market share. It is likely that most business leagues work 
towards some similar effort. 
Even with significant pressure from CTI and the government during 
the Depression, the mills could not cooperate to fix prices.396 CTI did 
achieve success, however, as the central mouthpiece of the cotton manu-
facturing trade. The Institute’s leaders came to be respected voices of the 
industry, particularly before the government.397 CTI was particularly 
successful in persuading Congress to pass the constitutionally ill-fated 
National Industrial Recovery Act. 398 As Galambos says, “voluntarism 
was being replaced by majority control with coercion of the recalcitrant 
minority.”399 CTI formed a committee under authority of the Recovery 
Act to draft a code to govern the cotton textile industry. Cotton manufac-
turers took a command of their industry and became its main voice.400 
However, the Court struck down the Recovery Act that had provided the 
support for the development of an industry code with the backing of the 
government, in 1935, and the industry had to go back to its normal asso-
ciative activity.401 
CTI no longer exists. It appears that the modern day representative 
of CTI is the National Council of Textile Organizations (NCTO) through 
a circuitous route of a somewhat dying US industry.402 In the 1940s, CTI 
primarily represented the northern mills; it joined forces with the Cotton 
Manufacturer’s Association, representing mostly southern mills to form 
the American Cotton Manufacturer’s Institute (ACMI).403 ACMI 
changed its name in 1962 to the American Textile Manufacturer’s Insti-
tute (ATMI) to recognize the reality of competing synthetic fabrics par-
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ticularly from foreign markets.404 The new organization worked to pro-
tect the American industry from foreign competitors, but it appears that 
these efforts were generally unsuccessful.405 
On April 1, 2013, the ATMI merged with two other trade associa-
tions from other parts of the textile industry to form the NCTO.406 The 
NCTO is small, with a little less than $2 million in revenue. It describes 
its current mission as being the representative of the textile industry.407 
“From fibers to finished products, from machinery manufacturers to 
power suppliers, NCTO is the voice of the U.S. textile industry,” and 
seeks “to advance the interests of the U.S. textile sector” on an interna-
tional stage.408 
This history of CTI shows at once the challenges of forming and 
maintaining a trade association, but also the incipient nature of such as-
sociations as a result of the availability of readily identifiable players, the 
resources to organize, and a strong identification of goals. War efforts 
tend to make the U.S. government feel dependent upon such organiza-
tions; this dependency provides trade associations extra force in their 
organizing effort. The government will provide assistance to ensure these 
organizations are able to form. The cotton trade associations were able to 
regularly organize well over a majority of the industry and had particu-
larly easy success on the issue of organizing to speak for the industry in 
front of government. Interestingly in comparison to the NFIB, the Cotton 
Textile Institute mounted a strong effort against anti-trust policy, while 
the NFIB, expressly created for small businessmen, pushed exactly the 
other way. 
C. Professional Associations 
Professional associations represent groups such as lawyers, doctors, 
scientists, architects, historians, engineers, and the specialty groups asso-
ciated with such professions.409 In general, the professions require a cer-
tain prescribed course of education that the association establishes; pro-
fessional associations typically require a college degree.410 Like business 
leagues in general, professional associations come in the form of peak 
associations as well as regional and specialty associations. 
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This section examines the American Medical Association (AMA). It 
is one of the oldest professional associations in the United States and has 
managed to amass a large percentage of the doctors of the United States 
into its membership. Approximately 15% of all doctors belonged to the 
AMA in 2011, down from 75% in the early 1950s.411 It has been studied 
from many different angles, especially in Paul Starr’s, The Social Trans-
formation of American Medicine.412 The AMA states that its mission is to 
“promote the art and science of medicine and the betterment of public 
health.”413 
1. American Medical Association 
State-based medical societies began forming in the late 1700s con-
temporaneously with the formation of medical schools.414 State societies 
worked to elevate their profession by instituting licensing mechanisms 
and required education.415 Nathan Smith Davis, a leader in the New York 
Medical Society, helped organize the AMA in 1847.416 
The New York Medical Society felt the need for a national organi-
zation because it was considering adopting new standards to apply to 
New York medical schools.417 The New York medical schools feared 
that if national standards were not raised, their new standards would be 
for naught.418 If New York were to put more stringent standards on its 
students, but the rest of the country’s medical societies failed to act in 
this way, it was believed that students would largely leave the New York 
medical education institutions.419 To further this motivation, in its first 
acts, the AMA established standards for medical education and drafted a 
medical code of ethics.420 In 1849 the AMA established a board to “ana-
lyze quack remedies” and to educate the public about such matters.421 It 
founded the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1883, which 
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for a long time was the AMA’s chief moneymaker and perhaps chief 
reason for joining the AMA.422 
The founders of medical societies in the nineteenth century were 
neither the elite doctors, who had nothing to fear from “quacks,” nor the 
hacks at the very bottom of the medical profession, who rightly feared no 
longer being able to practice their craft, but those folks in the middle who 
wanted to establish some distinction between themselves and the quacks 
and the hacks.423 Starr notes that while the AMA was successful in or-
ganizing, the AMA was generally unsuccessful in its first half century in 
its primary goal of implementing a licensing regime to exclude certain 
physicians from entry into the profession.424 Because the AMA was not 
successful during this period in enacting these licensing schemes, it was 
difficult to achieve significant membership.425 Additionally, the members 
of the medical profession did not need capital or hospitals to practice 
their craft so there were not significant pressure points the AMA could 
use to force membership.426 
As in the case of cotton interests, the AMA began achieving organ-
izing success at the turn of the twentieth century. By 1900, while the 
AMA had persuaded states to adopt licensing regimes, it still only had 
8,000 members, which amounted to about 8% of all doctors at that 
time.427 By contrast, 33,000 doctors belonged to the state medical socie-
ties and another 77,000 belonged to no society.428 
The AMA modified its membership and organizational structure at 
the turn of the century from a member-driven organization to one con-
trolled by the state medical societies. In 1901, the AMA adopted new 
rules creating its house of delegates that still exists today.429 The state 
medical societies elect representatives to serve on this policy making 
body of the AMA.430 The move from direct democracy to representative 
democracy allowed the state societies to exercise greater control of the 
national organization.431 This change was tremendously effective for 
both the state societies and the AMA. State societies experienced huge 
increases in membership from 1902 to 1904.432 
With these significant successes in hand, the AMA turned to medi-
cal education. The doctors of the AMA still believed there were too 
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many doctors.433 While medical education became more rigorous in the 
late nineteenth century,434 medical schools continued to form and the 
number of doctors practicing medicine increased at a rate faster than the 
AMA desired.435 The AMA directly attacked this problem by reducing 
the number of medical schools. In 1904, the AMA created a Council on 
Medical Education which immediately imposed more rigorous require-
ments on medical schools.436 The AMA required that to enter medical 
school, a student needed four years of high school.437 Further, to graduate 
from medical school, a medical student needed four years of medical 
education and was required to pass a licensing test.438 Finally, the AMA 
began to inspect medical schools to ensure accord with these new re-
quirements.439  
The changes altered the economics of medical education. The num-
ber of medical schools decreased from 162 to 131 in four years (i.e., by 
1910) and decreased to 95 by 1915.440 Most fundamentally though, the 
AMA made a cultural change in who trained new doctors. Instead of 
practicing doctors training new doctors, scientists and researchers took 
over this role.441 These changes caused a tremendous homogenization in 
the social makeup of doctors, and while women had been going to medi-
cal schools, it now pushed them away.442 The new requirements shut 
down five of seven medical schools that trained black students.443 Final-
ly, these changes reduced access to doctors in rural and poor areas.444 
Closing the ranks of the profession was not the sole goal of the 
AMA. It also saw patent drug makers as a competitor as well.445 By join-
ing forces with muckraking journalists, the AMA managed to significant-
ly alter the drug business to the benefit of doctors.446 After the turn of the 
century, with political pressure, the AMA helped to pass the Pure Food 
and Drug Act regulating acceptable food and drugs.447 The AMA estab-
lished the Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry to test drugs in its own 
laboratory to enforce the new law itself.448 This began a shift in the sale 
of drugs in the United States—instead of a drug company selling drugs 
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directly to the public, the drug companies began to sell drugs through 
physicians.449 “This strategic gatekeeping role permitted the AMA, in 
effect, to levy an advertising toll on the producers.”450 
These legislative forays that generated power for the medical pro-
fession over matters related to the medical business were effective for 
doctors. Doctor income grew twice as fast as the rest of the economy 
from the turn of the century to about 1928.451 Additionally, the social 
status of doctors increased tremendously.452 Thus unlike the cotton trade 
manufacturers, who perhaps had an easier time organizing, the doctors 
appear to have achieved greater success in the price stabilization game, 
and in fact, in the increasing price game. 
Twenty trustees govern the AMA today.453 Its House of Delegates 
still acts as its policy making body.454 The delegates come from medical 
associations (state or territorial), national medical specialty organiza-
tions, professional interest medical associations, the five federal services, 
and several of the AMA’s member sections and groups.455 There are over 
500 voting members of the governing body; many other members are 
allowed to observe twice annually held meetings.456 The AMA also oper-
ates seven councils that develop and share expertise on issues of ethics, 
science, and medical education.457  
The AMA offers a variety of selective incentives to members, and 
also some incentives that appear to have a compulsory nature. It sells 
regulatory administrative help, insurance, legal assistance, education, and 
information.458 More significantly, it controls an important code called 
the Current Procedural Technology code (CPT Code) that determines 
how any medical procedure is reimbursed by Medicare, and consequent-
ly other insurers.459 The AMA made about 28% of its revenue from the 
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CPT code in 2012.460 In order to practice in the health field today, a med-
ical practitioner or medical entity must purchase the rights to this Code. 
The AMA makes almost twice as much off its operation of the CPT 
Code as it does from membership revenue.461  
According to its 2012 Form 990 the AMA earned almost $250 mil-
lion in revenue.462 Approximately $39 million came from membership 
fees.463 It earned another $56 million from what it refers to as subscrip-
tions and also from items such as credentialing services, educational pro-
grams and graduate medical programs.464 It earned about $10 million 
through investment income and another $70 million from royalty income 
(the income from the CPT Code).465 The AMA earned another $8 million 
from the sale of securities and earned a little over a million from rental of 
property.466 Finally the sale of inventory brought the AMA $32 million, 
while the advertising brought in $19 million.467  
AMA revenue exceeded expenses by about $15 million in 2012.468 
Its revenues exceeded expenses by $21 million in 2011.469 It reports that 
at the end of 2012 it had net assets of $385 million.470 It reported to the 
IRS that it spent about $16 million on lobbying.471 According to OpenSe-
crets.org the AMA was one of the largest lobbying spenders in 2013.472 
In the 113th Congress, the AMA lobbied on over sixty different bills 
including on matters such as the Medicare Patient Empowerment Act of 
2013, Protecting Seniors’ Access to Medicare Act of 2013, and the 
SKILLS Visa Act.473 
D. Case Study Conclusion 
This section demonstrated the idiosyncratic and in part historical na-
ture of different types of business leagues that have formed, but also 
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demonstrates the incipient nature of the organizations of well-defined 
business interests. Notably, each of the organizations studied is, at heart, 
an interest group seeking to influence the governmental process. A 
strong anti-market and protectionist flavor imbues both the trade associa-
tions and the professional associations. Some peak organizations,  like 
the NFIB oppose this big business perspective. Finally, we see the readi-
ly identifiable finite groups that business leagues represent. These busi-
ness interests possess the skilled individuals and well structured organi-
zations that allow business interest to organize efficiently and effectively. 
Furthermore, the government often provides support and power to these 
organizations and relies on them to support various government interests. 
 Most importantly perhaps for purposes of this Article each of these 
organizations would have formed with or without the subsidy of exemp-
tion. We should thus expect as argued above that the subsidy of exemp-
tion brings more of these organizations into existence leading to some 
oversupply of a good or service that is already provided in sufficient 
quantity. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrated that the organizations we exempt from 
income tax under § 501(c)(6) are first and foremost interest groups. 
Business leagues seek to obtain goods and services from the government 
that can be helpful to their membership. Because tax exemption for these 
mutual-benefit organizations is a subsidy, we should want to justify this 
treatment. The predominant theory of tax exemption holds that tax ex-
emption provides a subsidy to aid the formation of groups that provide 
public goods or goods subject to market failure. While business leagues 
do provide certain public goods, and some business leagues face a collec-
tive action challenge, these organizations are not subject to the depth of a 
collective-action problem as are other groups, such as the poor. Tax ex-
emption for business leagues thus subsidizes many organizations that 
need no subsidy, and fails to subsidize a great number of interests, likely 
even within the business community itself that under the traditional theo-
ry of tax exemption are presumably deserving of subsidy.  
Because the subsidy is not structured to only help those organiza-
tions that truly need the help, we should expect that it leads to an over-
supply of business leagues and the goods and services they provide. As 
the review of empirical literature shows, business leagues dominate the 
interest group sector. Even if tax exemption only modestly enhances this 
bias, it is unclear why we would want to enhance the bias at all. Addi-
tionally, because federal tax exemption is a signal good entitling certain 
nonprofit organizations to additional rights and benefits, a removal of tax 
exemption could have a greater impact beyond just the subsidy from tax 
exemption.  
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This Article also assessed three positive cases to be made for ex-
emption for business leagues including that they enhance pluralism, that 
they serve an important informational function, and that they serve to 
regulate professions and industries for public benefit. The pluralism case 
is dismissed on the basis of theoretical and empirical work demonstrating 
that business interests already dominate the interest group domain. Be-
cause we have reason to believe the interest group sector is finite, we 
have reason to believe the subsidy to business leagues may very well 
crowd out other interests that have a harder time organizing. The infor-
mation theory is also dismissed. Again, the evidence is that business in-
terests will largely provide information to legislators in any case, and that 
we have no reason to believe that nonprofit organizations will provide 
more truthful information. If it could be shown that nonprofit organiza-
tions might provide more truthful information, the case for business 
leagues as constructed might become stronger. Finally, the claim that 
these organizations help to regulate the industry and should therefore be 
exempted on that basis is dismissed for two reasons: (1) the exemption is 
built to be much more inclusive than this narrow justification, and (2) 
even where these organizations regulate, they regulate primarily as a 
means to greater power as an interest group.  
The best choice, therefore, is to end tax exemption for business 
leagues. Legislators would need to take care to make it clear that busi-
ness associations could not otherwise qualify under § 501(c)(4). On is-
sues of disclosure of donors, it would be best to fight such battles outside 
of the Code in order to reduce the amount of attention the IRS needs to 
give to issues of politics. Finally, a second best solution would be to im-
pose a net investment income tax on business leagues in order to lessen 
the value of this ill-designed subsidy. 
